Search Results
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I.C.B.C v. Corporation of the City of Vancouver,
2000 BCCA 12
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2000/01/11
Court of Appeal
Motor Vehicle Insurance; Liability and Coverage: Two police Officers, S. and O., using police vehicle, S. driving and O. in passenger seat, decided to drive in front of and block vehicle thought to be stolen as stop light. Vehicle not actually stolen. Driver of stopped vehicle K. accidentally shot and seriously injured by O. Held: 1. K. is entitled to Part 7 Benefits; 2. S. is not jointly liable for O s negligence; 3. O. is an "insured" as an "operator" having, jointly with S., "care, custody and control" of police vehicle; 4. City is entitled to indemnity for its vicarious liability for negligence of O; 5: Appeal dismissed.
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I.C.B.C. v. Allianz Insurance,
2001 BCCA 28
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2001/01/17
Court of Appeal
The insureds, using a rented vehicle, had public liability coverage under three policies, a fleet policy, a rental vehicle policy and a composite mercantile policy with motor vehicle coverage. The decision confirms the trial judgment that the fleet policy was first loss insurance, the composite mercantile policy responded next and there was no coverage for this loss under the rental policy.
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I.C.B.C. v. Blue Mountain,
2004 BCCA 8
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2004/01/05
Court of Appeal
Application to discharge or vary order dismissing an application essential purpose of which was to circumvent Rule 21. Application dismissed. The appeal raises issues of mixed law and fact and therefore a transcript is necessary.
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I.C.B.C. v. Blue Mountain Collision Ltd.,
2003 BCCA 716
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2003/10/16
Court of Appeal
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I.C.B.C. v. Hosseini,
2006 BCCA 4
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2006/01/05
Court of Appeal
In August 1992, Mr. Hosseini was driving a stolen motorcycle when he crashed, severely injuring his passenger, Mr. Chan. There was some question whether Mr. Hosseini knew the motorcycle was stolen, whether he had permission of the owner to operate it, and whether he was licenced to operate a motorcycle. At I.C.B.C.'s instigation, Mr. Chan filed a claim with I.C.B.C. in the prescribed form under s. 20(2) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act, alleging he was injured by an uninsured motorist. I.C.B.C. did not act on that claim. Rather, when Mr. Chan sued Mr. Hosseini for damages, ICBC entered a third party notice under s. 21 of the Act, thus taking the position that Mr. Hosseini was an insured under the owner's certificate and alleging a breach by him of the policy. The lawyers for I.C.B.C. and Mr. Hosseini agreed in April 1997 that I.C.B.C. would defend the Chan action and they would deal with the alleged policy breach later. In April 1993, Mr. Hosseini was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident for which he was not at fault. The tortfeasor was a non-resident uninsured driver. As a result, Mr. Hosseini commenced proceedings with the object of recovering damages from I.C.B.C. under the UMP insurance provisions. While these proceedings were ongoing, in April 1998, I.C.B.C. delivered Mr. Chan's s. 20 notice to Mr. Hosseini. In February 1999, I.C.B.C., without Mr. Hosseini's consent, settled Mr. Chan's action for an amount that included other claims that Mr. Chan had in addition to his claim against Mr. Hosseini and consented to judgment in that amount. Mr. Hosseini then received a substantial arbitral award of damages under the UMP provisions. I.C.B.C. took the position that it was entitled to set off against Mr. Hosseini's award the amount it had paid to settle the Chan claim. In August 2000, I.C.B.C. commenced action against Mr. Hosseini alleging they were entitled to recover the amount paid to Mr. Chan under either s. 21(6) or s. 20(11) of the Act. I.C.B.C. subsequently amended its claim, abandoning reliance on s. 21 and proceeding on the basis it was entitled to judgment under s. 20(11), which provided that I.C.B.C. was subrogated to Mr. Chan's rights against Mr. Hosseini. On a summary trial conducted under Rule 18A, I.C.B.C. was awarded judgment against Mr. Hosseini for $1,080,000. Mr. Hosseini appealed. Held: The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and I.C.B.C.'s action was dismissed. The majority held that s. 20 is a complete statutory scheme dealing with claims against I.C.B.C. for injuries caused by uninsured motorists and, since I.C.B.C. had not complied with certain requirements set out in the section, it did not have a valid cause of action against Mr. Hosseini. The concurring justice would have allowed the appeal on the ground that I.C.B.C. was in breach of statutory duties and duties of good faith owed to Mr. Hosseini and that, since he suffered prejudice as a result, it was estopped from pursuing an action against him under s. 20.
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I.C.B.C. v. Linley,
2004 BCCA 21
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2004/01/09
Court of Appeal
Raincoast (cross-appellant) and another organization had applied under Freedom of Information statute for information about the location of grizzly bear kills in B.C. Ministry of Environment provided some but not all of information, relying upon s. 18(b) of the Act which provides information may be exempted from disclosure if likely to result in harm to conservation of an animal species. Applicants were not satisfied with detail of information about location of kill sites and applied to Commissioner of Act for order requiring more full disclosure. The Commissioner after hearing from parties and receiving information from, inter alia, a representative of appellant, Guide Outfitters, ordered more complete disclosure. Ministry sought judicial review invoking s. 18(b) and appellants sought judicial review, asserting that order of Commissioner flawed because he had not given appellants formal notice of and allowed their full participation in inquiry. Chambers judge dismissed petition of Ministry for judicial review but allowed in part petition of appellants on basis of breach of natural justice. She, however, directed that appellants would not be permitted to again canvas conservation issue previously argued by Ministry before Commissioner. Appellants appealed this limitation of their rights on rehearing that had been ordered and Raincoast and Commissioner cross-appealed seeking to sustain previous order of Commissioner. Court of Appeal allowing cross-appeals and dismissing appeal. Court finding that appropriate standard of review was reasonableness, that decision of Commissioner regarding notice and participation by appellants met that standard, that it was not shown that any unfairness had occurred vis-Ã -vis the appellants and that the chambers judge erred in allowing petition for judicial review brought on behalf of appellants. Deloitte & Touche LLP v. Ontario Securities Commission, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 713 referred to.
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I.C.B.C. v. Pohl's Bakery & Pastry,
2006 BCCA 51
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2006/02/03
Court of Appeal
Appeal from an order requiring the appellant to pay increased insurance premiums to I.C.B.C. dismissed. I.C.B.C. had undercharged the appellant for insurance as a result of a spelling error in the appellant's name on the certificate of insurance. The declaration of entitlement contained in the certificate of insurance attributes the responsibility for any errors contained therein to the insured. The appellant was therefore barred from claiming any benefit flowing from the error. Further, the chambers judge had not erred in determining that the vehicle insured by the appellant was a "substitute vehicle" for the purposes of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 204.
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I.C.B.C. v. Pozzi,
2004 BCCA 440
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2004/08/27
Court of Appeal
Appeal concerns distribution of $1,000,000 third party liability insurance proceeds between three claimants who were injured in a single car accident. Trial judge gave it all to Spehar who was catastrophically injured, primarily on the basis that the other two could fully recover their claims from their Underinsured Motorist Protection coverage. Held: It was reversible error to take into account other insurance coverage in istributing liability proceeds under ss. 21(13) and (14) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act.
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I.C.B.C. v. Yu,
2002 BCCA 484
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2002/08/08
Court of Appeal
The application by the defendant for leave to appeal from the order of a trial judge refusing his request for further and better particulars of the statement of claim prior to discoveries is denied. The proposed appeal does not raise a significant point of practice or procedure; nor is the issue of particular significance to the action itself at this early stage of the proceedings.
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I.C.R.V. Holdings Ltd. v. Tri-Par Holdings Ltd.,
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1994/11/08
Court of Appeal
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I.J. v. J.A.M.,
2013 BCCA 403
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2013/09/05
Court of Appeal
The appeal from an order striking a petition for judicial review is dismissed. The petition pleaded no reasonable basis upon which a court could quash a decision of the Human Rights Tribunal, and accordingly Rule 9-5(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules permits the petition to be struck.
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I.J. v. J.A.M.,
2013 BCCA 430
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2013/08/29
Court of Appeal
Applications brought in chambers for publication bans, initialization of the styles of cause, and sealing of this Court’s files. Orders of that nature had been made in the proceedings in the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Held: (1) the jurisdiction of a chambers judge to issue publication bans and sealing orders was doubted; (2) as in criminal matters, publication bans endure and continue to operate in respect of any appeal taken from the decisions in which the bans were originally issued; and (3) the styles of causes having been ordered amended (i.e., initialized), those styles of cause apply to the appeals.
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I.J. v. J.A.M.,
2015 BCCA 174
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2015/04/16
Court of Appeal
Application to review orders made by a judge of this Court in chambers dismissed.
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I.R. Capital Corp. v. Strata Plan NWS 3459 (Owners),
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1995/01/26
Court of Appeal
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I.R.C. and R.J. v. S.C.,
2006 BCCA 428
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2006/10/02
Court of Appeal
Rule 37 did not apply to offer of settlement made by defendant to two plaintiffs for "global" settlement; appeal dismissed.
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Iaci v. DiSalvo,
2012 BCCA 474
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2012/11/20
Court of Appeal
Appeal of an order granting judgment for the outstanding balance of a loan proven by the lender’s written record of payments. Dismissed.
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Iaci v. Martorana,
2014 BCCA 281
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2014/07/11
Court of Appeal
Appellant appeals on the basis that the trial judge did not give effect to his defences of res judicata, merger, and the doctrine of election in the litigation.
HELD: Appeal dismissed. The defences were inapplicable in the circumstances of this case.
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Iacobucci v. WIC Radio Ltd.,
1999 BCCA 753
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1999/12/16
Court of Appeal
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Ian J. Ward & Co. Ltd. v. Gilbert,
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1990/11/09
Court of Appeal
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Ian J. Ward & Co. Ltd. v. Gilbert,
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1991/02/25
Court of Appeal
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Iannone v. Hoogenraad,
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1992/03/20
Court of Appeal
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iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. v. Walmer Capital Limited,
2021 BCCA 48
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2021/01/29
Court of Appeal
iAnthus applied for an order approving a plan of arrangement pursuant to the B.C. Business Corporations Act. Although the plan was initially rejected, the judge approved the plan after iAnthus amended part of the plan to narrow the scope of a release of claims. The appellants opposed the application and now appeal on the grounds that the judge erred in approving the plan because: (i) iAnthus made a misrepresentation to the court by stating that all material financial information had been given to the shareholders and the court, when this was incorrect; and (ii) the appellants were denied an alleged security interest under the plan of arrangement. The appellants also apply to adduce fresh or new evidence regarding iAnthus’ financial status and related matters. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge made a palpable, but not overriding, error in finding that there were no undisclosed material changes from iAnthus’ first quarter financial results. The failure to deal with an alleged security interest of a different class does not bar approval of the plan. The evidence the appellants seek to adduce is not admissible under the Palmer test because they did not exercise proper due diligence and the evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the shareholder vote or the judge’s decision. The court is not required to reject a plan of arrangement solely because of inadequate financial disclosure, although it may be a relevant consideration.
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IAT Air Cargo Facilities Income Fund v. BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc.,
2011 BCCA 226
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2011/05/10
Court of Appeal
The chambers judge below correctly construed a financial services agreement between appellant BMO and the respondents. Appeal dismissed.
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Ibbitson v. Cooper,
2012 BCCA 249
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2012/06/06
Court of Appeal
The appellant, defendant at trial, appeals from an assessment of damages for past loss of earning capacity. Before the plaintiff/respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident he worked as a heli-faller. The respondent did not dispute that as a consequence of his injuries he could no longer work as a faller. After the accident he returned to work as an equipment operator. In that position he worked longer hours, at a lower hourly rate, but in doing so was able to earn on average, as much as he had earned before the accident. The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by awarding damages for past loss of income earning capacity in circumstances where the plaintiff had fully replaced his income, and that compensation for the hardship of working extended hours should be included under the award for general damages.
Appeal dismissed
The appellant suffered a pecuniary disadvantage as a result of his injuries. He is not disentitled to damages for loss of earning capacity because his industrious efforts to maintain his level of income have enabled him to replace that income.
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Ibbotson v. Fung,
2013 BCCA 171
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2013/04/12
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals the order of the chambers judge, which awarded a 25% proprietary interest in his house to the respondent, his former common law partner. The parties lived together for 15 years. They bought a house using funds they pooled together, which included a large sum provided by the appellant’s mother. The property was registered in the names of the appellant his mother as joint tenants. After his mother died, only the appellant was a registered owner. In 1999, the relationship ended. The value of the house grew substantially. The parties could not agree on the nature and quantification of the respondent’s interest in the property. The trial judge found that the parties were engaged in a “joint family venture” and awarded the respondent a 25% interest in the property. The appellant argues on appeal that the judge erred in doing so, which gave the respondent an interest which included the inflationary increase in the value of the house, rather than her recovery to any monetary contributions she made. Appeal dismissed.
Per Chiasson and Neilson JJ.A.: Without ruling out the possibility of a joint family venture over a single property, the thrust of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kerr v. Baranow relates to the division of the general assets of a family where the contributions of the parties may not be attributable readily to specific assets or where it may be inappropriate to attempt such an attribution. On the facts of this case, there was no need to resort to the concept of a joint family venture. On the basis of established principles the respondent was entitled to a constructive trust. There was sufficient evidence before the judge to justify such an award.
Per Garson J.A.: The concept of a joint family venture is sufficiently flexible to incorporate a single asset to the exclusion of others. The principles of unjust enrichment in family cases, the concept of a joint family venture and the practical convergence of monetary and proprietary remedies all point to this conclusion. A unified approach to division of property cases under the rubric of the joint family venture is preferred. On the facts of this case, there was a joint family venture; the judge’s decision to only include the Property in the joint family venture was not an error. The judge also did not err by including the inflationary value in the home. In any event, his conclusion could have also been supported with resort to the traditional principles of remedial constructive trusts. Finally, the judge made no error that would require intervention from this Court in his analysis of the exchange of mutual benefits.
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Iberdrola Energy Projects Canada Corporation v. Factory Sales & Engineering Inc. d.b.a. FSE Energy,
2018 BCCA 272
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2018/07/03
Court of Appeal
FSE entered into fixed-price contracts with Iberdrola to install boilers on two projects. It encountered financial difficulties, and Iberdrola entered into “settlement agreements” under which it paid subcontractors directly on behalf of FSE. When this failed to resolve FSE’s financial problems, Iberdrola entered into “payment agreements” under which it advanced payments to FSE into a jointly-administered bank account, with funds in that account being used exclusively to pay subcontractors. Despite these efforts, FSE defaulted on its obligations. Unpaid subcontractors made claims under s. 4 of the Builders Lien Act against Iberdrola, claiming that it ought to have held back funds under the settlement and payment agreements. Iberdrola contended those agreements were loans, and did not engage s. 4 of the Builders Lien Act. A Supreme Court judge held in favour of the subcontractors and Iberdrola appealed. Held: Appeal allowed in part. Appeal allowed in respect of the settlement agreements and dismissed in respect of the payment agreements. The judge made no error in finding that s. 4 of the Builders Lien Act applied to funds advanced under the settlement and payment agreements. They were payments on account of contracts, and that characterization was not affected by rights Iberdrola acquired against FSE. The settlement agreement payments, however, were payments under subcontracts, not under the contract between Iberdrola and FSE. As none of the subcontractors in this action claimed by or under those subcontracts, they have no claim of lien against amounts paid under the settlement agreements.
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Ibraheem v. Benevoli,
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1991/02/07
Court of Appeal
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Icahn Partners LP v. Lions Gate Entertainment Corp.,
2010 BCCA 556
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2010/12/07
Court of Appeal
The appellants, who are attempting to take control of the Board of Lions Gate Entertainment Corp., applied before a Justice in chambers for orders expediting this appeal and deferring the Annual General Meeting (the “AGM”) of the company. The appeal is from the dismissal of their oppression action arising out of a deleveraging transaction approved by the present board of directors of Lions Gate which had the effect of diluting the shareholdings of existing shareholders. The appellants are the largest shareholder. They apply to vary the order of the Justice dismissing their applications. The chambers judge concluded that the appellant’s attempt to take control of Lions Gate was not devastated. Expedition of the appeal to allow for a November 2010 hearing date was sought to meet a proposed December 15, 2010 date for the AGM or to a December hearing date with the AGM deferred. The judge was not satisfied the appeal could be heard and decided before that date and concluded it was in the interests of the shareholders that the AGM proceed as scheduled.
Application to vary dismissed. The appellants abandoned their application to defer the AGM and did not seek a November hearing date. Whether the application is to set an early date for or to expedite an appeal, concerning which parties have an expectation that the time-lines in the Court of Appeal Rules will apply, the issue involves weighing the relative prejudice to the parties. If an application were made in this Court to defer the AGM the parties must be prepared to address whether this Court, as opposed to the Supreme Court, could or should make such an order. The chambers judge made no error of principle and did not misapprehend the evidence. In addition, the present circumstances do not warrant interference with his order in the interest of justice.
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Icahn Partners LP v. Lions Gate Entertainment Corp.,
2010 BCCA 573
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2010/11/05
Court of Appeal
Application to expedite appeal with or without postponement of corporate annual general meeting dismissed.
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Icahn Partners LP v. Lions Gate Entertainment Corp.,
2011 BCCA 228
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2011/05/10
Court of Appeal
Appellants (“Icahn”) had been acquiring shares of Lions Gate Enterprise Corp. (“LG”) for some time, and sought to persuade LG’s board to endorse the appointment of five, then three, of twelve board members to be nominated by Icahn. The board was wary of Icahn’s reputation and refused. Eventually, Icahn made a bid for shares of LG as a result of which it held 37.9% of the LG shares. It was publicly critical of LG’s heavy debt and said it intended to unseat the directors at the next annual general meeting.
Although LG refused to give various covenants demanded by Icahn, LG and Icahn did agree on a “Standstill Agreement” for ten days, designed to allow LG to pursue a transaction of some kind with an outside party (“A”). When the Standstill Agreement expired after ten days, no transaction had taken place.
Immediately after the ten-day period, however, LG approved a “de-leveraging” transaction by which the holder of certain convertible notes exchanged them for new notes convertible on more favourable terms and then sold them to the “MHR” defendants, who then decided to convert them to shares. This had the effect of reducing LG’s debt by more than $100 Million, but also of diluting Icahn’s shareholding to 33.5%, which would make it more difficult for Icahn to obtain control of the board at the next AGM.
Icahn petitioned for an “oppression remedy” under s. 227 of the B.C. Business Corporations Act, contending that the de-leveraging transaction had been carried out for the improper purpose of maintaining the directors in office and that Icahn had had a reasonable expectation that even after the expiration of the Standstill Agreement, the directors would not carry out a transaction that would dilute Icahn’s shareholdings prior to next AGM.
The court below dismissed Icahn’s petition, holding that the directors’ primary purpose had been to reduce LG’s debt (of which Icahn had been publicly critical); that the directors had considered the dilutive effect on Icahn’s holdings but had reasonably regarded this effect as being in LG’s best interests; and that LG did not and could not have reasonably expected LG to forego the de-leveraging transaction in order to protect Icahn’s position. On appeal, Icahn took issue with the chambers judge’s conclusions on both branches – the “purpose” argument and the “reasonable expectation” argument – and contended that Icahn had not been treated fairly as required by BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders 2008 SCC 69.
APPEAL DISMISSED. Icahn had not shown that the chambers judge had erred in his reasoning or conclusions. Chambers jusge had considered the factors said to be relevant to “reasonable expectations” in BCE. BCE confirms that where the interests of stakeholders do not coincide with the interests of the company, the directors owe their duty to the company. In the circumstances of this case, Icahn could not have reasonably expected the board to act contrary to LG’s interests, and if they had done so, the directors would have been in breach of their duty to the company.
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Icam Technologies Corp. v. Ebco Industries Ltd.,
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1993/11/19
Court of Appeal
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ICBC v. Atwal,
2012 BCCA 12
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2012/01/11
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals an order finding him liable in conspiracy for conversion of a motor vehicle that was owned by ICBC, its insurer, after it had paid out a theft claim. The appellant car salesman had facilitated the sale of the vehicle which had been reported stolen, and given a false Vehicle Identification Number that was forged on Alberta vehicle registration documents naming a fictitious Alberta owner and address. The falsified registration certificate was forwarded for inspection and registration in B.C. on the pretext that the vehicle was being imported from Alberta. Ownership of the vehicle was then transferred into the name of a real person whose identity had been stolen. The vehicle was then resold to an innocent or complicit purchaser in the fraudulent scheme. This transaction was part of a larger “re-vinning” scheme, allegedly involving 58 vehicles, that operated throughout the lower mainland in 2002 and 2003. Appeal dismissed. The appellant failed to demonstrate any palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s factual findings or error of law in the trial judge’s inference-drawing process.
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ICBC v. Dick,
2020 BCCA 199
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2020/07/14
Court of Appeal
The appeal is from an order denying leave to amend a statement of defence and counterclaim and an order that the Supreme Court of British Columbia Registry refuse to file further material presented in the action by the appellant, with permission to destroy such material. Leave was required because an order in the Supreme Court of British Columbia prevents the appellant from filing any application in extant legal proceedings without first obtaining leave to do so. Judgment was given after trial against the appellant (and many other defendants) eight years ago. That order was not appealed. Judgment was given five years ago dismissing his counterclaim. The appeal from dismissal of the counterclaim was dismissed and the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal the judgment of this court. Held: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court of British Columbia is functus officio on the claim and counterclaim. That is, the action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia is at an end. In the circumstances the order directing the Registry with respect to newly presented documents was not an error.
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ICBC v. Katinic,
2003 BCCA 147
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2003/03/03
Court of Appeal
The correct order for costs in favour of I.C.B.C. for the defence of fraudulently assorted insurance claims is special costs. It is not a prerequisite for an order for special costs that the plaintiffs did something reprehensible in the conduct of the action.
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ICBC v. Le,
1999 BCCA 718
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1999/11/25
Court of Appeal
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ICBC v. Lo,
2006 BCCA 584
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2006/12/21
Court of Appeal
The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia is a public corporation that provides compulsory auto insurance in British Columbia. ICBC is also the public agency charged with licensing drivers under s. 25 of the Motor Vehicle Act. ICBC brought an action against various defendants arising out of a bribery scheme that enabled clients of a driving school to obtain British Columbia driver's licences regardless of whether they were properly tested or qualified to drive. Ms. Crispine Argana Diaz, the corrupt employee of the ICBC who enabled the fraudulent licences to be issued, received a certain portion of the bribe money but a greater portion was retained by the defendant Foon-Wai (David) Chiu, who was the principal of the defendant Dragon Driving School Canada Ltd. During the course of a jury trial, a question arose as to whether the ICBC's action against Ms. Fung Kwan (Tammy) Lo, the common law wife of Mr. Chiu, who held assets which had allegedly been purchased with the profits on the bribery scheme, could be maintained. The trial judge held that ICBC was entitled to a restitutionary remedy against Ms. Diaz, Mr. Chiu, and Dragon but only for the amount of the bribes paid to Ms. Diaz. As a result, the trial judge dismissed the action against Ms. Lo. The main issue on ICBC's appeal from the order dismissing the action against Ms. Lo is whether a restitutionary remedy lies against Mr. Chiu for the profit he made on a bribery scheme. Appeal allowed and action remitted to the trial court for determination of the outstanding issues.
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ICBC v. Patko,
2008 BCCA 65
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2008/02/18
Court of Appeal
The plaintiff ICBC appeals from the order of the British Columbia Supreme Court pronounced by Madam Justice Fisher in chambers on 15 February 2007 dismissing its application for a Mareva injunction restraining ICBC from paying to the defendant Jonathen Patko (J. Patko) the sum of $200,000. ICBC agreed to pay that sum to J. Patko to settle his claim for damages for injuries and other losses suffered as the result of an accident in August 1986. This accident was caused by the negligence of ICBC's insured, J. Patko's mother, Janet. HELD: The appeal is dismissed and the partial stay ordered by Madam Justice Fisher and continued by Madam Justice Levine is set aside. Madam Justice Fisher did not err in following the flexible approach described in Mooney v. Orr (1994), 100 B.C.L.R. (2d) 335 (S.C.) (Mooney No. 2). She did not err in holding that ICBC had failed to show there was a real risk that the defendant would dissipate the asset. Madam Justice Fisher did not err in referring to some case authorities not cited to her by either party. This Court will not interfere with the judge's exercise of her discretion.
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ICBC v. Yuan,
2009 BCCA 279
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2009/06/12
Court of Appeal
The Human Rights Tribunal refused to dismiss a complaint as having no reasonable prospect of success. On judicial review, the Supreme Court held that the tribunal’s refusal was a patently unreasonable exercise of discretion. Held: Appeal dismissed, except as to remedy. The tribunal’s interpretation of the effect of the Human Rights Code on the complaint was patently unreasonable. It should have dismissed the complaint at the preliminary stage. The Supreme Court did not err in intervening before the tribunal had finally decided the complaint. However, the remedy granted by the court – a broad declaration as to the interpretation of the statute – was not appropriate. It should have simply quashed the tribunal’s decision and dismissed the complaint.
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Icecorp International Cargo Express Corp. v. Aerocar Logistics (BC) Inc.,
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1996/12/10
Court of Appeal
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Icecorp International v. Nicolaus,
2007 BCCA 97
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2007/02/07
Court of Appeal
Appeal concerning the interpretation of Rule 37(37) of the Supreme Court Rules. The chambers judge found that Rule 37(37)(b) did not apply to restrict the plaintiff to its disbursements when it accepted an offer for "a sum within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court", because "the proceeding…could not appropriately have been brought in the Provincial Court". The plaintiff's claim was for an amount significantly in excess of the monetary limit of the Small Claims Court. Held: appeal dismissed. The word "appropriately" is not restricted to jurisdictional bars to proceeding in Provincial Court. The amount of the claim, and in some cases, other factors, may be considered in determining whether the proceeding could appropriately have been brought in Provincial Court.
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Idle-O Apartments Inc. v. Charlyn Investments Ltd.,
2010 BCCA 460
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2010/10/19
Court of Appeal
SUMMARY: Appeal from the order of a Supreme Court judge finding s. 73.1 of the Land Title Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, S. 250, added by amendment to the Act in 2007 (Miscellaneous Statues Amendment Act (No. 2), 2007, S.B.C. 2007, c. 24, s. 26), was to be given retrospective effect, validating an unregistered lease of unsubdivided land entered into for 99 years in 1974 and amended to extend the term to 998 years in 1978, reversing the effect of the decision of this Court in International Paper Industries Ltd. v. Top Line Industries Inc. (1996), 20 B.C.L.R. (3d) 41 that such leases are void ab initio and thus illegal and unenforceable. The trial judge found that s. 73.1 was remedial legislation, intended to correct the “mischief” and “hardship” caused by Top Line.
Held: Appeal allowed and matter remitted to the Supreme Court to decide unadjudicated claims. There is nothing in the language of s. 73.1 that either expressly or by necessary implication requires that it be given retrospective effect, and thus there is no basis in law for concluding that the Legislature intended it to have that effect.
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Idle-O Apartments Inc. v. Charlyn Investments Ltd.,
2014 BCCA 451
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2014/11/20
Court of Appeal
In 1978, the Appellant (“I-O”) granted a 998-year lease to the Respondent (“C”) for a portion of recreational land for the specified purpose of recreational use by C’s directors and their children. C subsequently made various improvements to the land. However, the lease constituted an unapproved subdivision contrary to s. 73 of the Land Title Act and was therefore invalid as a result this court’s 1996 decision in International Papers Industries Ltd. v. Top Line Industries Inc. After discovering that the lease was invalid, I-O sued for exclusive possession. C sought to remain on the land on the bases of proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment.
Summary trial judge ruled C’s claims were established, and that proper remedy for proprietary estoppel was to grant a “replacement lease” on same terms as original. It would be binding only between the parties, consistent with s. 73.1, which was enacted in response to Top Line. I-O submits trial judge erred in concluding proprietary estoppel was established and in effectively applying s. 73.1 retrospectively. Alternatively, it argues remedy was inappropriate and disproportionate to any detriment suffered by C.
Held: Appeal allowed in part. Trial judge did not err in finding elements of proprietary estoppel were established. The “representation” made by I-O was not founded on the invalid lease, but on I-O’s conduct. The fact C’s mistake as to its legal rights was shared by I-O was not a bar to proprietary estoppel. It was open to trial judge to find detrimental reliance on basis of the improvements made by C, and opportunities it had missed to resolve the subdivision problem in 1978.To allow I-O to insist on its strict legal rights in these circumstances would be unconscionable.
It was not necessary for the trial judge to apply s. 73.1 retrospectively to grant a remedy for proprietary estoppel. The remedy was not an attempt to validate an invalid lease, but a response to the parties’ conduct. Remedy did not “stultify” the operation of the Land Title Act. S.73.1 could be considered as one factor in determining current public policy, but even in the absence of s.73.1, the remedy of a contract binding only on the parties could have been arrived at, consistent with the statutory scheme and underlying policies at time of the court’s order.
The remedy for a claim in proprietary estoppel must represent the minimum equity necessary to do justice. In making this determination, it is not always necessary the remedy be strictly proportionate to claimant’s detriment. Here, because both parties clearly expected C to remain in occupation of the land for many years, it is appropriate to give effect to that expectation to a certain degree. However, it is also important to consider public interests affected by remedy of a “replacement lease” (in fact an order containing the same terms as the invalid lease), including the importance of the policy objectives underlying subdivision requirements. Accordingly, remedy was varied such that C’s rights under the terms of the order will cease on the death of all current directors and of their children.
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IDSS Enterprises Ltd. v. Dynasty P.G. & Grandsons Holding Inc.,
2013 BCCA 354
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2013/07/29
Court of Appeal
Dynasty P.G. & Grandsons Holding Inc. appeals from an order awarding IDSS Enterprises Ltd. $316,900 in damages and double costs of the trial. Dynasty and IDSS were equal shareholders in a company. When their relationship deteriorated, Dynasty agreed to purchase IDSS’s shares in the company and to share “profits”, defined as the difference between the accounts receivable and accounts payable, equally. IDSS agreed to share the “liabilities” equally. However, the required accounting and payment were not provided to IDSS. IDSS then successfully sued Dynasty for breach of contract. As Dynasty’s accounting evidence was inadmissible and unreliable, the judge used the company’s bank statements to assess “profits” at $633,922.11. In supplementary reasons, the judge dismissed Dynasty’s application to reopen the trial and ordered double costs against Dynasty on the basis IDSS had made a formal offer to settle for less than the ultimate judgment against Dynasty. Dynasty appeals on the grounds the judge erred in failing to consider Dynasty’s counterclaim for one-half of the company’s liabilities, erred in drawing an adverse inference against Dynasty regarding disclosure of its financial documents, erred in his assessment of the profit to be divided between the parties, and erred in awarding double costs. Held: Appeal allowed. In assessing damages, the judge did not address IDSS’s responsibility to share half of the company’s liabilities. In particular, he overlooked the uncontested shareholders’ loans of $400,000, and the award should be reduced to $116,900. This reduction in damages means the judgment is less than IDSS’s formal offer to settle, so it is not entitled to double costs. Finally, the judge was justified in drawing an adverse inference against Dynasty, given the dismal state of its financial and accounting records. IDSS is awarded ordinary costs on the appeal and in the trial court.
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IDSS Enterprises Ltd. v. Global Agriculture Trans-Loading Inc.,
2010 BCCA 181
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2010/04/01
Court of Appeal
Appeal raising a question of whether judgment should have been entered on a summary trial. Dismissed.
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IE CA 3 Holdings Ltd. v. NYDIG ABL LLC,
2024 BCCA 38
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2024/01/30
Court of Appeal
The respondent applies for an extension of time to file a notice of cross-appeal and a cross-appeal factum. Held: Extension granted. There was a dispute about the scope of the order that was not resolved until after the time for filing a notice of cross appeal. Finality plays a lesser role in considering extensions to file cross appeals than it does extensions to bring an appeal. The appellant will not be unduly prejudiced by the delay in filing the cross-appeal. The interests of justice favour all matters in dispute arising from the trial judgment being resolved in one hearing.
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Iezzi v. British Columbia,
2012 BCCA 200
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2012/05/10
Court of Appeal
Appeal from a finding that the action was not barred by the two year limitation period. The judge held that the period was postponed because of the respondent’s personal circumstances and she was justified in waiting until she obtained documentary proof of her claim before commencing the action.
Held: The evidence would not support the finding related to personal circumstances. As for the delay in getting proof, nothing in the record explained why the respondent could not have done much earlier what she did to gather the proof.
Appeal allowed; action dismissed.
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Ikon Office Solutions Inc. v. British Columbia,
1999 BCCA 89
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1999/02/12
Court of Appeal
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Il Caminetto di Umberto Restaurant (1982) Ltd. v. Mountainside Lodge Ltd.,
2006 BCCA 408
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2006/09/13
Court of Appeal
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Il Caminetto di Umberto Restaurant (1982) Ltd. v. Watson,
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1997/12/19
Court of Appeal
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Ileman v. Rogers Communications Inc.,
2015 BCCA 260
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2015/06/09
Court of Appeal
Appeal from the chambers judge’s refusal to certify a class action. Mr. Ileman sought to certify a class action against the respondents, telecommunications companies, on the basis that the term “system access fee” misled consumers into believing that the fee was a government levy. Held: appeal dismissed. There is no cause of action as the term “system access fee” does not have the capability of misleading consumers. The chambers judge erred in finding that an interest within the meaning of s. 172(3)(a) of the BPCPA is a proprietary interest, but the restoration claim pursuant to s. 172(3) was nonetheless bound to fail as the plaintiff had no interest recognized by law. The chambers judge did not err in finding that the claims for unjust enrichment or monies had and received were bound to fail.
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