Search Results
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L. (D.) v. British Columbia (Director of Children and Family),
1999 BCCA 145
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1999/03/08
Court of Appeal
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L. Lundgren Holdings Ltd. v. Sterling Construction,
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1997/03/11
Court of Appeal
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L.(H.) v. L.(M.H.),
2003 BCCA 484
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2003/09/11
Court of Appeal
Appeal from an order that the appellant pay his former wife spousal support in the amount of $2,000 per month, reviewable in three years. The order is a variation of a previous time-limited spousal maintenance order. The parties entered into a separation agreement providing for spousal support payments for a period of two years. The spousal support provisions of the separation agreement were incorporated into an order for divorce. By a subsequent variation order the spousal support payments were extended for a period of ten months. Following the expiry of the first extension the respondent wife applied to further extend the spousal support payments. Her application was allowed and the support payments were reinstated. Held: Appeal allowed. The parties entered into a final and binding agreement. The fact that the wife is unable to find employment is not sufficient reason to conclude that the agreement should not govern the parties' post-divorce obligations towards each other. Further there was no evidence linking the wife's inability to find work to something that occurred during the marriage. The wife's lack of marketable skills was not related to or caused by the marriage
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L.(K.H.) v. L.(G.Q.),
2003 BCCA 313
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2003/05/29
Court of Appeal
Appeal from declaration that the parties' marriage was a nullity. The trial judge found that the appellant had demonstrated an invincible aversion to consummating the marriage. Held: appeal dismissed. There was ample evidence from which the trial judge could draw the inference that the appellant had an incapacity due to an invincible aversion to sexual intimacy with the respondent.
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L.A.C. v. G.N.W.,
2016 BCCA 132
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2016/03/18
Court of Appeal
The parties are the parents of a five-year-old girl. They divorced in March 2015, and consented to a final order settling child custody issues. At the time, the mother was unemployed, and looking for work both in the Lower Mainland and further afield. Only days after the consent order was pronounced, the mother obtained work in Victoria, and by June 2015, she had an offer of permanent work there. A move to Victoria was incompatible with the parenting schedule and the education arrangements in the order. The mother contended that her move to Victoria for work was a change in the circumstances of the child, allowing the court to vary the order under s. 17(5) of the Divorce Act. The judge agreed, finding that the move had not been actually contemplated when the consent order was pronounced. She found it to be in the best interests of the child to move with her mother to Victoria, and varied the order accordingly. The father appeals. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge’s findings support her conclusion that the move was not actually contemplated when the order was made, so it constituted a change in circumstances.
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L.A.M. v. C.P.M.,
2006 BCCA 76
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2006/02/15
Court of Appeal
An appeal from an order for shared custody is dismissed, the appellant having shown no error in principle or any error in the trial judge's appreciation of material evidence.
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L.C.T. v. R.K.,
2017 BCCA 64
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2017/02/08
Court of Appeal
The appeal arises from orders made after a family law trial where the primary issue was whether the respondent father’s parenting time with the children should be supervised. The claimant mother alleged that the respondent had inappropriately touched the children, was violent towards her, and had drugged her and abused substances himself. The trial judge did not find the claimant credible and concluded that her allegations were embellished in an attempt to demonize the respondent. The judge granted the respondent unsupervised parenting time with the children; dismissed the claimant’s applications for retroactive child support and s. 7 expenses; reduced the respondent’s child support obligations because he found that the respondent’s costs of exercising parenting time created hardship; and ordered that the claimant return certain chattels to the respondent. The claimant is the appellant in this Court. She raises the following grounds of appeal: (1) the judge incorrectly approached the parenting time issue from the perspective of the respondent’s entitlement rather than by considering the best interests of the children only; (2) the judge improperly weighed the evidence in concluding that her allegations against the respondent were unsupported; (3) in dismissing her claim for retroactive child support, the judge erred by focussing on her conduct and misapprehended the evidence; (4) in dismissing her s. 7 expenses claim, the judge improperly concluded that religion had not played an important role in the family prior to separation; (5) the judge did not apply the correct legal test in reducing the respondent’s child support obligations; and (6) the judge ordered her to return certain chattels without any evidence being adduced at trial. The appellant also seeks to adduce new evidence on appeal which purports to show the judge’s bias towards her, her psychological state of mind at the trial, and the anxiety one of the children is experiencing when having unsupervised visits with the respondent.
Held: appeal dismissed except in respect to the judge’s reduction of child support for the respondent's costs of exercising parenting time; motion to adduce new evidence dismissed. From a contextual reading of the whole reasons for judgment, it is clear that the judge properly applied the best interests of the child test in determining if the respondent’s parenting time should be supervised. The judge weighed the evidence and made findings of fact and credibility that were amply supported by the evidence. The judge’s decisions to dismiss the appellant’s applications for retroactive child support and s. 7 expenses were discretionary in nature and are owed deference. He made no palpable and overriding errors. The judge did err in reducing the respondent’s child support obligations because of his costs of exercising parenting time. A reduction in child support obligations because of undue hardship under s. 10 of the Guidelines is a high threshold to meet; the hardship must be severe, extreme, improper, unreasonable, or unjustified. The respondent’s costs of exercising parenting time do not meet this threshold. Accordingly, the judge’s order is varied and the respondent’s child support obligations are increased to the Guidelines amount of $758 per month. The appellant’s motion to adduce new evidence is dismissed because the evidence is not within the acceptable parameters of fact that might be considered for admission.
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L.D. (Guardian ad litem of) v. Provincial Health Services Authority,
2012 BCCA 491
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2012/11/30
Court of Appeal
Appeal allowed. Most of the plaintiffs’ claims were struck out by the chambers judge following an application under Rule 9-6(4). The Court of Appeal held that the claims were novel and inappropriate for disposition under rule 9-6(4).
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L.D.B. v. A.N.H.,
2023 BCCA 480
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2023/12/28
Court of Appeal
This is the first appeal brought by the appellant mother in this highly contentious family proceeding. The respondent father has been declared a vexatious litigant in both this Court and the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The appellant appeals the dismissal of her application seeking resumption of spousal support, pursuant to s. 167(3) of the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25. The parties had a four-year marriage-like relationship. At trial, the respondent was ordered to pay spousal support for four years. This order was extended by one year following a review application. Approximately four years after the expiration of the spousal support order, the appellant applied to reinstate support on the basis of a material change in the respondent’s vexatious litigation conduct which had caused the appellant mental and psychological harm and disabled her from work. On appeal, the appellant argues that: the order should be set aside because of procedural unfairness and a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the chambers judge; the chambers judge erred in failing to consider her application to increase the monthly amounts paid by the respondent towards his outstanding child support arrears and costs; and the chambers judge erred in dismissing the application for resumption of spousal support. Held: Appeal allowed, but only to the extent of remitting the question of whether the monthly payments for outstanding arrears and costs should be increased to the trial court. The appellant is unable to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the chambers judge or that the application was procedurally unfair. The chambers judge’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish a material change in circumstances is entitled to deference and the appellant is unable to identify a material misapprehension of the evidence or error in principle.
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L.D.B. v. A.N.H.,
2024 BCCA 61
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2024/02/14
Court of Appeal
The appellant mother brings an appeal from an order that a full s. 211 report be prepared, varying the judge’s earlier order that a more limited views of the child report be prepared. Held: Appeal allowed. The judge erred in principle in varying her earlier order when there was no change in circumstances. The respondent father’s refusal to comply with the earlier order was not a change in circumstances supporting the husband’s application.
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L.J. v. Dir. of Child, Family and Community Services,
2000 BCCA 446
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2000/07/26
Court of Appeal
In appeal from judgment giving answers to "stated case" questions in a child protection proceeding, court held that since original decision that children were in need of protection was not appealed, this decision could not be questioned in subsequent proceedings. However, court partially allowed appeal concerning permissible scope of evidence that could be led at subsequent hearing in order to permit hearing judge to make unfettered decision concerning admissibility of evidence.
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L.K.C. v. M.I.C.,
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1993/01/28
Court of Appeal
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L.M. v. British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Services,
2016 BCCA 109
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2016/03/04
Court of Appeal
A chambers judge ordered that a child whom the respondent Director of Child, Family and Community Services proposes to place for adoption in Ontario, continue to remain in the care of her ‘foster parents’ in British Columbia, pursuant to s. 10 of the Court of Appeal Act, pending the disposition of appeals in which the appellants seek to adopt her. The child would be prejudiced if she were now removed from the appellants’ care, and then had to be moved back if the appeals were allowed.
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L.M. v. British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Services),
2016 BCCA 367
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2016/09/13
Court of Appeal
The appellants have been the foster parents of an infant child who is in the permanent care of the Director of Child, Family and Community Services. By a continuing custody order the Director is the sole personal guardian of the child (s. 50(1) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act). The Director has expressed her hope to place the child in the care of a couple in Ontario who have adopted two siblings of the child, with the intention the child will be adopted by the couple. That adoption would be according to the laws of Ontario. The appellants wish to adopt the child and petitioned for an order of adoption in their favour, and (by a second petition) for relief under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The appellants appeal the dismissal of those petitions (other petitions in the Supreme Court of British Columbia have not been resolved). Held: appeals dismissed. Parens patriae jurisdiction, advanced as the basis for an adoption order in favour of the appellants, does not permit the court to order adoption of a child outside the statutory scheme. There is no basis for the orders sought in the first petition. The second petition centered on issues that should have been advanced on the first petition and are res judicata.
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L.P.T. v. M.R.,
2013 BCCA 140
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2013/03/27
Court of Appeal
Application for leave to appeal a refusal by a chambers judge to vary an order requiring the provision of a DNA sample on certain conditions. Application dismissed on the basis that the refusal to vary the order was a discretionary decision that did not engage any error in principle.
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L.R. v. British Columbia,
1999 BCCA 689
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1999/11/26
Court of Appeal
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L.S. and S.S. v. British Columbia (Ministry of Children and Family Development),
2004 BCCA 244
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2004/05/03
Court of Appeal
Appeal from judgment dismissing a petition for judicial review consequent upon an application by respondent below purportedly pursuant to Rule 34 for an order that the appellants had no status to attack a decision of the respondent concerning a foster child. The application was misconceived and ought not to have been entertained. Pursuant to Rule 52, pleadings and a trial were ordered. The respondents were not precluded from seeking a trial under Rule 18A.
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L.S. v. G.S.,
2016 BCCA 346
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2016/08/09
Court of Appeal
This judgment addresses three appeals: (1) L.S. appeals from an order varying the terms upon which she is entitled to exercise custodial rights (CA42807). The chambers judge found that a deterioration of her mental health constituted a material change in circumstances and varied an earlier order by imposing upon L.S. stricter conditions, including a daily witnessed medication requirement. He also ordered the preparation of a report under s. 211 of the FLA to assist him in determining the best interests of the children having regard to L.S.’s chronic mental health challenges. Held: appeal dismissed. It was open to the chambers judge to find that the change in L.S.’s mental health constituted a material change in circumstances. Having made this determination, it was open to the chambers judge to impose an interim order pending receipt of the report under s. 211 of the FLA; (2) G.S. appeals from the order of a chambers judge permitting L.S. to apply to vary a travel restriction term relating to her without demonstrating a material change in circumstances (CA43102). The chambers judge held that a “liberty to apply” term included in the previous order and effective one year after the date of that order permitted L.S. to apply to vary the travel restriction term as of right. Held: appeal dismissed. The chambers judge made no error in concluding that L.S. had liberty to apply to vary the travel restriction term after one year without demonstrating a material change in circumstances; (3) G.S. also appeals from the dismissal of his application for an order that L.S. be found in contempt of court as a result of her non-payment of a special costs order (CA43315). In conjunction with the appeal, he sought to adduce new evidence relating to L.S.’s capacity to pay the costs order. Held: application to adduce new evidence dismissed; appeal dismissed. The proposed evidence did not meet the test for the admission of new evidence on appeal. The chambers judge made no error in fact or in law in dismissing the contempt of court application.
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L.S. v. G.S.,
2015 BCCA 416
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2015/09/23
Court of Appeal
The appellant filed a notice of abandonment of the appeal after a cross-appeal was filed, after time expired for filing the Appeal Record, and before filing the Appeal Record. The question is the time then available for the respondent (appellant on cross-appeal) to file the Appeal Record. Held: time began to run from the time the appellant on cross-appeal became the sole appellant, that is, when served with the notice of abandonment.
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L.S. v. G.S.,
2014 BCCA 334
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2014/08/25
Court of Appeal
In 2011, a trial judge made an order for divorce and permitted the respondent mother to move the children with her to Israel. In April 2012, this Court allowed the appellant father’s appeal, set aside the mobility order made at trial, and ordered the children be returned to Vancouver. This Court also ordered joint custody with primary residence to the appellant and access to the respondent in Vancouver on a shared parenting basis, all under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), and joint guardianship under the Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128.
The appellant and children returned to Vancouver, and the respondent followed. The Supreme Court of British Columbia then varied the respondent’s access to order access on an “equal parenting” basis on a seven-day rotation.
When the respondent had an episode of her bipolar disorder, a judge made an “interim” order that replaced the respondent’s access with supervised access. When the respondent recovered, another judge varied the “interim” order and reinstated access on a three-day rotation between the parties, with conditions for the respondent. The appellant appealed.
A month later, the appellant brought various applications under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, based on the respondent’s failure to return the children to Vancouver in accordance with this Court’s April 2012 order. The judge dismissed the applications. The appellant also appealed from that order.
The two appeals were heard together.
Held: As to the first appeal, the judge correctly narrowed the issue before him to whether there had been a material change in circumstances since the respondent’s admission to hospital in light of her recovery and unconditional release from hospital. It was open to the judge to find the respondent’s recovery constituted a material change in circumstances since her admission to hospital, and to reinstate access on an equal parenting basis, on conditions.
As to the second appeal, this case was not commenced, litigated, or concluded under the Family Law Act. This Court’s discretion to address new issues not previously raised is generally exercised sparingly and only where the interests of justice require it. It is not in the interests of justice for this Court to engage in the exercise of statutory interpretation required to resolve issues of jurisdiction not argued before the trial court.
Appeals dismissed.
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L.T. v. D.T. Estate,
2020 BCCA 328
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2020/11/24
Court of Appeal
Appeal of an order dismissing an application to permit the use of a deceased donor’s reproductive material to produce an embryo even though the donor’s consent to that use had not been provided in conformity with the governing legislation. Held: Appeal dismissed. Parliament has enacted a criminal prohibition on the posthumous use of a donor’s reproductive material unless the donor had given prior, informed, written consent to its removal and use for that purpose. The donor had not given his consent in the required form. The Court must give effect to Parliament’s clearly expressed intent.
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L.V.R. v. Mountain Institution (Warden),
2015 BCCA 442
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2015/10/26
Court of Appeal
The appellant applies for the waiver of photocopying fees and the disclosure of Static-99-R and Stable-2007 scoring matrixes by the respondent. Held: application dismissed. The decision to waive photocopying fees is within the respondent’s discretion. This Court is not the proper forum to challenge the exercise of such discretion. A justice may order the production of documents that have potential relevance to an appeal. The scoring matrixes have no relevance to this appeal.
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L.V.R. v. Mountain Institution (Warden),
2016 BCCA 467
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2016/11/23
Court of Appeal
The appellant, an inmate at Mountain Institution, petitioned to the court for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, challenging Correctional Service of Canada’s initial classification of him as a medium security inmate and the subsequent denial of his request for reclassification as a minimum security inmate and transfer accordingly. He appeals the chambers judge’s dismissal of his petition. HELD: Appeal dismissed. An inmate must demonstrate a deprivation of his or her residual liberty interests before a court hearing a habeas corpus petition may inquire into the lawfulness of the detention. Neither the initial classification nor the denial of a transfer to a lower security facility constitute the requisite deprivation of residual liberty. The appellant’s residual liberty had never been deprived since his unchallenged committal. The chambers judge did not err in dismissing the petition.
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L.V.R. v. Warden of Mountain Institution,
2017 BCCA 20
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2017/01/13
Court of Appeal
Supplementary reasons as to costs.
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L’Association des parents de l’école Rose-des-vents v.,
2014 BCCA 40
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2014/01/31
Court of Appeal
Supplementary reasons on costs following the allowance of the appeal. The petitioners were granted a declaration in the Supreme Court that their minority language rights under s. 23 of the Charter had been infringed and were granted special costs on the basis of their status as successful public interest litigants. The Province successfully appealed the declaration and the petition was remitted to the Supreme Court. The Province seeks an order setting aside the special costs order as well as an order granting its costs of the appeal.
Held: order that the award of special costs in the Supreme Court proceedings be set aside and costs be remitted to the judge hearing the petition and an order that the parties bear their own costs of the appeal. The bases for the judge’s award of special costs to the petitioners have been obviated by the disposition of the appeal. The issues on appeal do not merit costs to the unsuccessful party.
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L’Association des parents de l’école Rose-des-vents v. British Columbia (Minister of Education),
2013 BCCA 407
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2013/09/20
Court of Appeal
An appeal from the orders of a Supreme Court judge (“the judge”), in case management and sitting in Chambers, dealing with minority language education rights provided for in s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
L’Association des Parents petitioned for a declaration that the petitioner’s s. 23 rights had been breached. In case management, the judge struck certain paragraphs of the Province’s response for irrelevance and further ordered that the petition would be heard in three parts, addressing three issues: whether there is equivalency in facilities and transportation for English and French language students in the relevant catchment area; whether any inequality amounts to a charter breach; and if so, what remedy should be afforded to the petitioners. In his reasons for judgment on the first issue the judge held that the petitioner’s s. 23 rights had been breached.
The issues on appeal are the legal test to strike pleadings and the procedural fairness of the judge’s decision in the first phase of the petition.
Held: order that the order striking paragraphs of the Province’s response be set aside, and order that the declaration of the judge that the petitioner’s s. 23 rights had been breached be set aside and the petition be remitted to the Supreme Court.
The test for striking pleadings is stringent and a claim may only be struck if it is plain and obvious that it discloses no reasonable cause of action. The paragraphs struck from the Province’s response may have some relevance. The judge’s disposition on the first phase of the petition unfairly prejudiced the Province because the plain meaning of the case management phasing order was that the breach of s. 23 rights was to be the subject of the second phase, and the Province was precluded from obtaining evidence to support its defence.
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La Commission Scolaire Francophone du Yukon No. 23 c. Procureure Générale du Territoire du Yukon,
2012 YKCA 1
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2012/02/08
Court of Appeal
Application to review and vary an order refusing intervenor status to three parties in a pending appeal to the Yukon Court of Appeal. When the three proposed intervenors filed their applications for intervenor status, the hearing for those applications was set for December 9, 2011, the same date as for the filing of the appellant’s factum. A revised filing schedule subsequently went into effect, and consequently the date for the filing of the appellant’s factum was delayed until after the hearing for the applications for intervenor status. Following the hearing, Mr. Justice Groberman denied the applications.
The three applicants apply to review and vary the order, on the ground that the hearing of their application before the filing of the appellant’s factum caused them prejudice and violated the law. They also argue that Groberman J.A. erred in applying the principles governing intervenor applications.
HELD: Application dismissed. The applications for intervenor status were accommodated within the schedule fixed by the parties. None of the intervenors took the position that their applications had to be heard after the filing of the appellant’s factum. The timing of the application hearings resulted in no prejudice to the applicants. With respect to the substance of the decision, the judge correctly applied the requisite tests, and made no errors of law or principle.
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La v. Le,
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1993/02/25
Court of Appeal
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Laak v. Mills et al,
2003 BCCA 631
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2003/11/10
Court of Appeal
Appeal from the awards of a jury for damages for "whiplash" injury: non-pecuniary damages $15,000; special damages $1,300; past income loss $18,000; future income loss, nil. Appeal dismissed. The plaintiff's credibility was a central issue at trial. The awards could not be said to be inordinately low. The judge's instruction on credibility was not unfair. " LGF CJBC"
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Labadie v. Hegel,
2017 BCCA 446
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2017/12/13
Court of Appeal
Appeal from an order dismissing an application to set aside a default judgment where the defendant challenged what was an alternative service order for the Notice of Civil Claim after having done nothing to have the judgment set aside for more than six months after he learned it had been entered. Held: Appeal dismissed. There was, in the circumstances, no justification for interfering with the order dismissing the application.
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Labatt Brewing Co. Ltd. v. British Columbia,
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1997/11/25
Court of Appeal
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Labatt Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Interior Brewery Workers Union,
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1997/09/11
Court of Appeal
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Labatt Brewing Company Limited v. Interior Brewery Workers’ Union, Local 308,
2018 BCCA 108
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2018/03/15
Court of Appeal
Collective agreement provided for employer to reimburse employees’ prescription drug costs. Later the employer notified employees that in order to be reimbursed, they must order drugs from a pharmacy company online or by phone. Drugs obtained from local pharmacies would not be reimbursed. Grievances were brought by the union on the basis that the new policy violated the collective agreement and privacy rights of employees. Arbitrator allowed the grievances, ruling that on construction of agreement the employer had transformed a simple right to be reimbursed into an obligation to enter into a relationship of trust with the pharmacy company. The new program ‘unreasonably diminished’ the rights given in the agreement. The Employer sought to appeal, arguing the Court had jurisdiction because the “basis” of the award was privacy law – a matter of general law. Appeal quashed. The “basis” of the award was the construction of the collective agreement, and thus the matter did not fall within s. 100 of the Labour Relations Code. The Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
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Labell v. Labell,
2006 BCCA 45
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2006/01/24
Court of Appeal
Court below had erred in cancelling child support arrears of over $33,000 accumulated over several years. While it was unlikely respondent, a fisherman largely dependant on E.I., would ever be able to meet this obligation, he had not met burden to show non-cancellation would be ‘grossly unfair'.
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Labonte v. British Columbia (Adult Forensic Psychiatric Services),
2013 BCCA 278
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2013/06/04
Court of Appeal
The appellant is the subject of a disposition order of the British Columbia Review Board, having been found not criminally responsible due to his mental disorder. He has been subject to varying dispositions for some five years, and pursuant to s. 672.72(1) of the Criminal Code appeals his most recent disposition that he be detained in custody and reside at the Forensic Psychiatric Hospital because he is a risk to public safety and there are no community resources capable of managing him.
Held: The appeal is dismissed. The standard of review from a finding by the Board is that of reasonableness: R. v. Owen, 2003 SCC 33 at para. 33. Neither the Board’s assessment of the appellant’s risk to public safety nor its conclusion that there are no community resources capable of managing the accused are unreasonable.
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L'Abri B.C. Ltd. v. School District no. 34 (Abbotsford),
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1994/07/22
Court of Appeal
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Labus Investments Ltd. v. Funk,
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1993/04/27
Court of Appeal
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Labus Investments Ltd. v. Funk,
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1994/09/23
Court of Appeal
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Lac La Ronge Indian Band v. British Columbia,
2023 BCCA 117
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2023/03/03
Court of Appeal
The appellant applies to cancel or vary a direction of the Registrar in which he referred the respondent’s quash applications to a division, to be heard in advance of the appeals. Held: Application dismissed. The Registrar’s decision amounted to a scheduling decision, which is owed a high degree of deference. The division hearing the quash applications retains the discretion to decide whether to hear the applications in advance or to have them heard alongside the appeals.
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Lac La Ronge Indian Band v. British Columbia,
2024 BCCA 58
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2024/02/22
Court of Appeal
The applicant seeks orders quashing appeals of orders denying the appellant leave to intervene in a class action and approving a settlement. Held: Application allowed, appeals quashed. The application should be heard and determined in advance of the appeals. The appellant lacks standing to appeal the settlement approval order and the appeal of the intervention order is manifestly meritless and raises issues that are moot.
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Lacerte v. Singh,
2005 BCCA 541
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2005/10/17
Court of Appeal
Court directed that leave to appeal is required to appeal an order that Rule 37 did not apply to an offer to settle made to plaintiffs jointy by defendants sued severally. Time extended to file notice of application for leave to appeal, notice of motion and motion book.
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Lacerte v. Singh,
2006 BCCA 289
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2006/06/07
Court of Appeal
Action by multiple plaintiffs against multiple defendants for multiple causes of action. Defendants made joint offer in From 64 to settle all actions. Actions dismissed after trial. Defendants applied for costs under Rule 37(24)(b). Trial judge dismissed application on ground that Rule 37 does not permit joint offers by multiple defendants sued severally. Appeal dismissed.
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Lacey v. Weyerhaeuser Company Limited,
2013 BCCA 252
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2013/05/28
Court of Appeal
Weyerhaeuser’s corporate predecessor, MacMillan Bloedel Ltd., promised salaried employees lifetime retirement medical benefits at the employer’s cost. Weyerhaeuser unilaterally reduced its contribution to the premiums for the insurance for the benefits from 100% to 50% as of 1 January 2010, with the retirees to bear the cost of any future increase in premiums. Five of the retirees affected sued for damages for breach of contract. The trial judge found that the promise of MacMillan Bloedel to pay the premiums was contractual. He awarded damages and made certain declaratory orders as well. Held, the judge did not err in finding that Weyerhaeuser had an ongoing contractual obligation to pay the premiums. The respondents were entitled to damages in the amounts each had to contribute to the premiums from 1 January 2010 to the date of the order under appeal. However, the declaratory provisions in the order were not appropriate. They were not relief asked for in the pleadings. Appeal allowed only to the extent of striking out the declaratory clauses in the order and rewriting the clauses awarding damages.
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Lacroix v. Loewen,
2010 BCCA 224
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2010/05/07
Court of Appeal
The defendants Lorne Loewen and D&S Bulldozing Ltd. appeal the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Williamson of the Supreme Court of British Columbia pronounced in chambers on 26 February 2009 striking out paragraph 3 of the statement of defence. The main issue on this appeal is whether the trial judge can be said to have erred in striking paragraph 3 of the statement of defence.
HELD: appeal allowed. The chambers judge held that there was a settlement and that ICBC then repudiated the agreement by insisting upon terms that were not agreed upon. In determining whether or not there was a settlement and the scope of that settlement, the chambers misapplied the principles of contractual interpretation. Applying the principles of contractual interpretation, the communications between Mr. Mickelson and the adjuster, Mr. Per, objectively indicate that there was an enforceable settlement including both tort and Part 7 claims. Looking at all the material facts, the reasonable objective bystander would conclude that the parties intended to make a final settlement of both tort and Part 7 claims. Additionally, while the above conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the repudiation issue, the chambers judge incorrectly applied the law relating to repudiation. It was an error to conclude that the mere tendering of documents with terms that have not been agreed upon can constitute repudiation. The correct statement of the law is set out in Fieguth v. Acklands Ltd. (1989), 37 B.C.L.R (2d) 62.
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Ladner Reach Properties Ltd. v. Cameron,
2020 BCCA 198
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2020/06/22
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals an order striking two paragraphs of her amended counterclaim and dismissing most of her application for production of documents. Held: Appeal allowed and application for documents remitted to the trial court for determination. In striking portions of the counterclaim, the judge did not consider whether the pleading in issue was material to the appellant’s plea of deceptive and unconscionable acts or practices and the declaratory and injunctive relief sought under s. 172 of the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“BPCPA”). With respect to document production, the judge assessed the relevance and materiality of the documents sought without regard to the s. 172 BPCPA claim, and without regard to the facts pleaded in the paragraphs struck. As such, her determinations cannot stand. This Court should not make specific rulings on document production, and that matter should be remitted to the trial court for determination.
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Ladner v. Ladner,
2004 BCCA 366
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2004/06/28
Court of Appeal
The court dismissed an appeal from an order dismissing a claim for priority in the distribution of an estate on the basis of the deceased's breach of a separation agreement. It concluded the cause of action had merged with an award of damages granted in an earlier proceeding.
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Ladner v. Ladner,
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1991/07/31
Court of Appeal
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Ladner v. Ladner,
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1997/02/25
Court of Appeal
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Ladner v. Vancouver (City of),
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1992/11/24
Court of Appeal
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Ladner v. Wolfson,
2011 BCCA 370
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2011/09/08
Court of Appeal
In a separation agreement, the husband (now deceased), undertook to arrange life insurance payable to the wife in an amount sufficient to cover his spousal support obligations. He failed to do so but he did have other life insurance payable to his estate. His estate was insolvent and the wife claimed a constructive trust over the insurance proceeds so as to gain priority over his other creditors. This appeal raises, in the context of an action in negligence by the wife against her solicitor for failing to pursue a trust claim, the question of whether a constructive trust may be imposed over insurance proceeds when there is no proprietary nexus between the life insurance contemplated in the separation agreement and the other life insurance payable to the husband’s estate on his death.
The trial judge held that Roberts v. Martindale (1998), 162 D.L.R. (4th) 475 (B.C.C.A.), and Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, provided a basis on which such a claim could have been advanced.
Held: Appeal allowed, and the action against the solicitor was dismissed. Cross-appeal dismissed.
The relationship between the spouses, once the separation agreement was concluded, did not involve continuing fiduciary and equitable obligations, and absent such a relationship, the first of the Soulos conditions for the imposition of a good conscience trust was not fulfilled. Further, a good conscience constructive trust ought not to be imposed absent a proprietary connection between the property over which the wife sought to impose the constructive trust, and the property that was the subject of the separation agreement. Therefore the trial judge erred in imposing a constructive trust over the insurance proceeds that were payable to the estate of the husband.
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