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Posted Tuesday, April 7, 2026:
Aulinger v. Oda,
2026 BCCA 140
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2026/04/07
Court of Appeal
In the underlying appeal, this Court affirmed the validity of a 1995 will. The respondent now asks the Court to order that reasonable indemnity costs of all parties be paid from the estate. Held: Application allowed. All parties should recover reasonable indemnity costs from the estate because this is clearly a case in which litigation was reasonably necessary in light of the surrounding circumstances and content of the 1995 will.
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Kaur v. Gill,
2026 BCCA 144
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2026/03/26
Court of Appeal
Ms. Kaur seeks leave to appeal from a costs decision, awarding Mr. Gill lump sum costs of some $164,000, including a special costs award of some $67,000, following a trial on parenting and relocation issues in a contentious family law proceeding. At the hearing of the leave application, Ms. Kaur’s main arguments were that the trial judge erred in: (1) finding that Mr. Gill was the substantially successful party at trial, (2) awarding special costs when the conduct in issue was related to a particular time period that, in her submission, preceded the trial itself, (3) awarding lump sum costs as a proportion of Mr. Gill’s draft bill of costs, and thereby failing to have regard to the need for caution in forgoing the normal process for assessment of a bill of costs by the Registrar, and (4) awarding costs for specific pre-trial applications, after having fashioned a lump sum award based on a draft bill of costs covering the entire proceeding. HELD: Application dismissed. None of these grounds of appeal raise matters of principle that are important to the practice or extend beyond the parameters of this particular case, which weighs against granting leave. Although there remains a second phase of the proceedings yet to be resolved (property division), the costs ruling does not determine any issue of significance to the ongoing proceedings, and the amount in issue, while substantial, is not significant in comparison to the actual legal fees said to have been incurred by each party to date. There is arguable merit in some of the grounds of appeal, a factor which weighs in favour of granting leave. Granting leave to appeal would not directly hinder the ongoing proceedings, but it would undermine the principle of finality as regards the costs proceedings and the conduct underlying the special costs order, which will cause the parties to continue to look backward, rather than looking forward to resolve the remaining issues in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner. On balance, the factors weighing against leave to appeal prevail, and it is therefore not in the interests of justice to grant the application.
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Richmond (City) v. British Columbia (Utilities Commission),
2026 BCCA 139
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2026/04/07
Court of Appeal
After an inquiry, the British Columbia Utilities Commission decided that local government corporations that are wholly owned and wholly operated by municipalities and regional districts are public utilities within the meaning of the Utilities Commission Act. However, the Commission went on to recommend to government that these types of corporations be exempted from application of the Act, subject to an annual reporting requirement. The appellant municipalities appealed the resultant order, arguing the Commission misinterpreted the meaning of the term “municipality” under its governing legislation. From the appellants’ perspective, the reference to “municipality” in the definition of a public utility under s. 1(1) of the Utilities Commission Act includes wholly owned and wholly operated energy corporations and these entities therefore fall outside the Commission’s regulatory authority. The appellants also argue the inquiry process leading to the Commission’s order was procedurally unfair.
HELD: Appeals dismissed. Applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation, the Commission correctly interpreted the scope of the municipal exclusion from the definition of a public utility under the Utilities Commission Act. The meaning of the term “municipality” is precise and unequivocal when read in conjunction with the Interpretation Act, and the Commission’s narrow construction accords with the context, objects, and purpose of the Utilities Commission Act. The appellants’ argument about procedural unfairness also fails. They received ample opportunities to provide input on the questions stated at the inquiry, including the framework to be applied in assessing whether a municipality’s local government corporation qualifies for an exemption from application of the Utilities Commission Act.
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Taddeo v. Ouellet,
2026 BCCA 141
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2026/04/07
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals from the dismissal of his petition, brought pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the return of the parties’ child to Mexico. The dismissal was based on the chambers judge’s finding that returning the child to Mexico would place him in an intolerable situation as contemplated by the grave risk of harm exception in Article 13(b) of the Convention. The appellant argues the record in the proceeding below was materially incomplete due to ineffective assistance from his previous counsel. He also argues the judge erred in finding the grave risk of harm exception was met based on circumstances that are beyond its scope and below the high threshold for an exception to a mandatory return order.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The appellant’s fresh evidence application and ineffective assistance of counsel argument must fail absent evidence of either his former counsel’s communications with him or the evidence he says was material to the petition record. The judge did not err in finding there was a grave risk that returning the child to Mexico would place him in an intolerable situation under Article 13(b). The grave risk of harm exception includes a grave risk that a return order would place the child in an intolerable situation for reasons other than physical or psychological harm. The judge made no error in finding that placing the child in circumstances that include no housing or means of financial support establishes an otherwise intolerable situation.
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Thomson v. Thomson Estate,
2026 BCCA 142
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2026/04/07
Court of Appeal
The appellants appeal the dismissal of their actions for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation on the basis that the trial judge erred in finding there was no oral contract formed between the appellant, Ms. Thomson, and her father, Allan Thomson, for her reinstatement in the family business, the A.R. Thomson Group. Held: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge properly identified the appropriate legal principles of contract formation and made no reviewable errors in assessing the evidence concerning the formation of the contract including the certainty of its essential terms and the parties’ intention to contract.
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Posted Thursday, April 2, 2026:
The Nuchatlaht v. British Columbia,
2026 BCCA 137
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2026/04/02
Court of Appeal
The appellant, the Nuchatlaht, brought a claim for Aboriginal title to 210 square kilometers of Nootka Island on the west coast of Vancouver Island, none of which is subject to competing claims or held by third parties. At trial, the judge made a declaration of Aboriginal title to portions of the claimed area. The appellant challenges this declaration on the basis that the judge misapplied the sufficient occupation element of the test for Aboriginal title and adopted a site specific approach. Held: Appeal allowed. The trial judge erred in restricting Aboriginal title to areas of site specific use when assessing sufficient occupation, and in drawing an arbitrary boundary for title, which did not reflect the evidentiary record before the court. The appellant has established sufficient occupation to the entire claimed area, and accordingly a declaration of Aboriginal title is made for this area as pleaded.
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Posted Wednesday, April 1, 2026:
Malik v. Malik,
2026 BCCA 136
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2026/04/01
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges a trial judge's order dismissing her claim of a trust over an interest in a property owned by her family. She claimed in part that the trust was formed on the basis of an express agreement that title would be held for her benefit. She produced some written evidence of the trust at trial but had since recovered a written agreement between her and the owners, purporting to grant a trust in her favour.
Held: Application to admit fresh evidence granted. Appeal allowed and new trial ordered. The written agreement produced for the first time on appeal meets the Palmer test and should therefore be admitted. A new trial is necessary to determine the weight of the new evidence on the appellant's claim in trust.
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