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Posted Thursday, March 12, 2026:
Marida Holdings Ltd. v. Wang,
2026 BCCA 104
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2026/03/12
Court of Appeal
The appellants appeal the orders of a chambers judge setting aside a default judgment and subsequent damages assessment. They contend that the judge erred in law by relying on Rule 22-1(3) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules as a basis to set aside the damages assessment. They also contend that the judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact in determining whether the respondent was guilty of willful delay or default in responding to the appellants’ claim. Held: Appeal dismissed. The appellants were ordered to serve their damages assessment application substitutionally, and did so, giving the respondent standing to apply to set the damages assessment aside under R. 22-1(3). The judge did not make the alleged palpable and overriding errors of fact.
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Posted Wednesday, March 11, 2026:
VM Agritech Limited v. Smith,
2026 BCCA 101
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2026/03/11
Court of Appeal
Appeal from a chambers judgment upholding the decision of an associate judge who refused to set aside a default judgment. The appellants argue that an associate judge has no jurisdiction to decide a set aside application, and that the chambers judge violated vertical stare decisis in concluding they did, because this Court has previously ruled that would violate s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. In the alternative, the appellants say the chambers judge misapprehended evidence regarding the delay in filing their response to civil claim.
Held: Appeal dismissed. An associate judge has jurisdiction to decide applications to set aside a default judgment. The prior decision of this Court saying they do not was decided per incuriam. Further, the s. 96 jurisprudence has evolved sufficiently since this Court decided that case to reconsider the issue. Finally, the chambers judge did not misapprehend the evidence and the conclusions she drew were open to her.
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Posted Tuesday, March 10, 2026:
Glassen v. Glassen,
2026 BCCA 99
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2026/03/10
Court of Appeal
The appellant husband appeals from the trial judge’s orders granting equal division of family property, final parenting decision-making authority to the respondent wife, and possession of the family dog to the respondent. He seeks to adduce new evidence in support of his position that the judge made errors in her findings of fact. Held: Appeal dismissed. An appeal is not a re-trial, and this Court must treat with deference a trial judge’s findings of fact, application of the law to those facts, and exercise of discretion. The appellant repeats the arguments made at trial and has not demonstrated a reviewable error. Moreover, the new evidence the appellant seeks to introduce was either available pre-trial or is irrelevant to the issues on appeal.
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Glioza v. Ardalani,
2026 BCCA 97
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2026/03/10
Court of Appeal
Following a four-day trial in this family law case, the trial judge granted an order that (i) the appellant, Ms. Glioza, and the respondent, Mr. Ardalani, be divorced, (ii) to achieve an equal division of family property, Ms. Glioza must make an equalization payment of $478,642, after which she would retain the former family home (worth $815,000), (iii) Mr. Ardalani must pay monthly child support of $1,000, and (iv) Ms. Glioza was not entitled to spousal support. On appeal, Ms. Glioza challenges every aspect of the order except the divorce. HELD: Appeal allowed, in part. The trial judge misapprehended the evidence in relation to Ms. Glioza’s payment of private school fees for the parties’ child. The balance of Ms. Glioza’s arguments reflect her dissatisfaction with the outcome at trial but are not grounded in any reviewable errors.
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McCotter v. Mission Institution (Warden),
2026 BCCA 107
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2026/03/06
Court of Appeal
The applicant, Mr. McCotter, applies for appointment of counsel to assist him in arguing his appeal from the decision of a Supreme Court justice, refusing appointment of counsel in connection with a petition of habeas corpus. Mr. McCotter seeks the order appointing counsel under either s. 684 of the Criminal Code, or under the common law based on Charter jurisdiction. HELD: Application dismissed. Mr. McCotter cannot rely upon s. 684 of the Criminal Code, because his habeas corpus petition — which relates to the apparent refusal of Corrections officials to prepare a community release plan for use at future parole applications — is civil in nature. Nor has Mr. McCotter pointed to any statutory provision or court rule giving a justice of this Court the jurisdiction to appoint counsel to assist an appellant in a civil appeal. The principal authority relied upon by Mr. McCotter, New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, is distinguishable on a number of bases, and is not authority for the appointment of counsel in the appeal court to assist an appellant in a civil appeal.
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Moradi v. Whole Foods Market,
2026 BCCA 105
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2026/03/10
Court of Appeal
These reasons address three applications brought in Court of Appeal chambers: (a) security for costs of the appeal; (b) extension of time to file the respondent’s factum; and (c) stay of costs ordered in the Supreme Court of British Columbia. HELD: Security for costs in the amount of $7,500 is ordered. The respondent is granted an extension of time to file its factum. The appellant’s application for a stay of costs in the Court below is dismissed as unnecessary.
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Vancouver School District No. 39 v. Kingsgate Property Ltd.,
2026 BCCA 98
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2026/03/10
Court of Appeal
This is an appeal from orders made staying and then setting aside awards made at arbitration. The appellant challenges the stay on the basis that the chambers judge erred by finding he had jurisdiction under s. 31(3) of the Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 55, to issue a “stay of obligations”, by misapplying the test for a stay, and by granting a stay that supplemented his prior leave to appeal order. The appellant challenges the award on the grounds the chambers judge failed to apply the appropriate standard of review and erred in law in concluding the award was not open to the arbitrators as a result of the application of issue estoppel.
Held: Appeal dismissed, Justice Willcock dissenting.
Dissent (per Justice Willcock): Appeal allowed in part. The chambers judge did not err in granting the stay or in considering the potential miscarriage of justice that may arise from the arbitration award pending its appeal if not stayed. The standards of review for appeals under the Arbitration Act are the appellate standards described in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33. As only questions of law may be appealed under the Act, the applicable standard of review is correctness. Applied here, the 2022 arbitration panel did not err in interpreting the 1999 arbitration award, in exercising their discretion to not apply issue estoppel, or in interpreting the lease and determining the market value of the land for the purpose of establishing rent.
Majority (per Justice Winteringham and Justice Fleming): There is agreement with Justice Willcock on his disposition of the appeal of the first order, and on the applicable standard of review for appeals under the Arbitration Act. However, there is disagreement on the substantive issue on appeal from the second order. Applying the Housen standards, the majority decision of the 2022 arbitration panel was incorrect in refusing to apply issue estoppel. They misidentified the issue to which estoppel applied and considered irrelevant factors in refusing to apply issue estoppel. The chambers judge exercised discretion to not remit the calculation of rent to the 2022 arbitration panel. No error being shown, that discretionary decision is owed deference.
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Vandenbosch v. Rogers Communications Canada Inc.,
2026 BCCA 102
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2026/03/10
Court of Appeal
This appeal is primarily about whether the respondents should be granted a stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration despite amendments to the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, which void arbitration clauses in consumer contracts entered into before the enactment of the amendments. On the respondents’ applications for stays of proceedings, the judge found that the amendments did not apply to the appellant’s claim, which arose before the amendments came into force. The judge also exercised her discretion to extend the stay of proceedings to the Match respondents because the claims against Match and Rogers arose from the same factual matrix.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge was correct that the amendments were retrospective but not retroactive, and therefore did not apply to the appellant’s claims which arose prior to the amendments being enacted. The appellant may not raise new arguments or revive abandoned arguments in this Court. The judge also did not err in extending the stay to the Match respondents.
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Posted Friday, March 6, 2026:
0842729 B.C. Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal,
2026 BCCA 96
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2026/02/06
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges a summary trial decision granting judgment against her personally for loans provided to her business under the Canada Small Business Financing Program. She argues the judge erred: (i) in finding the matter suitable for summary determination; (ii) in failing to consider, or making errors of fact in considering, her defences of fraud, misrepresentation, and non est factum; and (iii) in permitting duplicative judgments. Held: appeal dismissed. The judge did not err in determining the matter was suitable for summary judgment. The record does not support the appellant’s argument that there was contested evidence that would have required viva voce evidence to allow the judge to make credibility findings. The judge considered the appellant’s defences, or the factors relevant to the defences, and gave a reasoned basis for rejecting them. The appellant has failed to establish any palpable and overriding error in the judge’s findings. The judge did not permit double recovery: in guaranteeing her business’s loans, the appellant agreed to be jointly and severally liable for their repayment.
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British Columbia (Minister of Education and Child Care) v. Duncan,
2026 BCCA 91
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2026/03/06
Court of Appeal
The appellants, the Minister of Education and the Lieutenant Governor in Council, appeal orders requiring them to produce documents, and dismissing their application to strike a petition under the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009. The orders were made in a judicial review proceeding in which the respondents challenged two ministerial orders and a cabinet order in council, claiming that the orders were made in bad faith and for an improper purpose, and that the appellants were owed a duty of procedural fairness.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The chambers judge was correct in concluding that it is not plain and obvious that the impugned decisions did not attract a duty of procedural fairness, or that the bad faith/improper purpose claims will fail. There was also no error in the chambers judge’s document production orders including: additional documents that were before the Minister when the ministerial orders were made; a better description of the documents over which privilege was claimed; and extrinsic evidence to ensure the Court could fulfill its supervisory role on judicial review.
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College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia v. Madryga,
2026 BCCA 100
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2026/03/06
Court of Appeal
The appellants, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia (the College) and the Attorney General of British Columbia, appeal a chambers judge’s declaration that ss. 26.2 and 53 of the Healthcare Professions Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 183 [HPA], which prohibits the disclosure of documents created or produced in respect of the College’s Quality Assurance Programs, are unconstitutional. The order was made in the respondent’s civil claim alleging that the College improperly interfered with the medical care he received from his treating physicians. The chambers judge found that the sections of the HPA violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, holding that they provide no avenue for review by a court to determine whether documents or information referred to in such sections should be produced in the context of litigation. The appellants submit the chambers judge erred in concluding that the sections of the HPA violated s. 96 and in not ordering the College to provide a better description of the privileged documents in its list of documents and/or viewing the documents to determine the validity of the College’s privilege claims.
Held: Appeal allowed. The chambers judge erroneously concluded that ss. 26.2 and 53 of the HPA denied the respondent access to the court in breach of s. 96 of the Constitution Act. Nothing in the HPA overrides R. 7-1(20) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, which allows a judge to review the documents to assess whether they should be produced in the context of litigation, or the judge’s ability to make an order under R. 7-1(14)(b)(ii) requiring a further and better description of the documents over which privilege is claimed under R. 7-1(7).
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Powell River Energy Inc. v. British Columbia (Utilities Commission),
2026 BCCA 93
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2026/03/06
Court of Appeal
The appellant, Powell River Energy Inc. (“PREI”), the owner and operator of two hydroelectric generation and transmission stations in or near Powell River, appeals from a decision of the British Columbia Utilities Commission (“Utilities Commission” or “Commission”) holding that it is a “public utility” subject to regulation under the Utilities Commission Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 473 [UCA]. PREI produces and distributes electricity that is supplied to one or more corporate subsidiaries, for sale in the export market. The company argues on appeal that the Utilities Commission erred in its interpretation of the term “public utility”. HELD: Appeal dismissed. On a correct interpretation of the UCA, PREI fits within the broad definition of a “public utility”, and its supply of electricity to one or more corporate subsidiaries for sale in the export market does not fit within the statutory exception for self-supply.
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