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Posted Tuesday, December 9, 2025:
Christoffersen v. British Columbia (Minister of Justice),
2025 BCCA 432
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2025/12/09
Court of Appeal
This appeal is summarily dismissed pursuant to s. 21 of the Court of Appeal Act, because the claim is clearly statute-barred. Further, the chambers judge was correct to say the respondent police did not owe a private law duty of care to the appellant to meet a standard of care in the manner in which they conducted an investigation. The claim founded upon the Crown’s vicarious liability for the acts impugned in the pleadings is bound to fail for that reason as well.
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Knight v. British Columbia (Public Safety),
2025 BCCA 445
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2025/12/04
Court of Appeal
The applicant seeks leave to appeal orders emanating from a Case Planning Conference held in respect of his civil action against the respondent, the Minister of Public Safety. His notice of civil claim alleges an abuse of authority, gross negligence, unprofessional conduct, and a violation of his rights under the law. He also applies for an order that no fees be payable under R. 85(6) of the Court of Appeal Rules, B.C. Reg. 120/2022.
Held: Applications dismissed. Leave to appeal is denied principally because the grounds of appeal lack merit, constituting fine parsings and mischaracterizations of the judge’s reasons, and because the orders made are highly discretionary. The proposed appeal is of little to no significance to the practice because it is highly case-specific. Allowing this appeal to proceed would hinder the progress of the action, because the appeal would have to be heard before the trial. A Case Planning Conference is only meant to move litigation along efficiently to trial. The application that no fees be payable is also dismissed because the appeal lacks merit, it is frivolous and vexatious and is otherwise an abuse of the court’s process.
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Posted Friday, December 5, 2025:
Gitxaala v. British Columbia (Chief Gold Commissioner),
2025 BCCA 430
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2025/12/05
Court of Appeal
The appellants, the Gitxaala and Ehattesaht First Nations, challenged the mineral tenure system under the Mineral Tenure Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 292. They alleged the operation of the automated online registry system permitting “free miners” to register claims to mineral rights on Crown land prior to consultation with affected First Nations was inconsistent with the duty to consult, the honour of the Crown, s. 3 of British Columbia’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, S.B.C. 2019, c. 44 (“Declaration Act”), and the rights recognized in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP” or “Declaration”). The chambers judge found there was a breach of the duty to consult. However, he found the Declaration Act did not create justiciable rights and it did not implement UNDRIP into the laws of BC.
Majority (per Justice Dickson and Justice Iyer): Appeals allowed. The judge erred in adopting an unduly narrow approach to the legal effect of the Declaration Act and UNDRIP. Properly interpreted, the Declaration Act incorporates UNDRIP into the positive law of British Columbia with immediate legal effect. It affirms the interpretive lens through which BC laws must be viewed and the minimum standards against which they should be measured. The Crown has a statutory duty under s. 3 of the Declaration Act to consult and cooperate with the province’s Indigenous peoples in addressing inconsistencies between rights and standards in UNDRIP and the laws of BC. The issue of consistency between the Mineral Tenure Act and UNDRIP is a justiciable question. UNDRIP and the mineral claims regime are inconsistent.
Dissent (per Justice Riley): The Declaration Act gives the executive branch of government a statutory mandate and duty to take all measures necessary to bring British Columbia’s laws into alignment with UNDRIP, as an exercise in legislative reconciliation. Oversight and accountability for this law reform exercise is assigned to the legislative branch of government. Nowhere in the Declaration Act is the judicial branch invited or called upon to adjudicate claims of inconsistency between UNDRIP and British Columbia’s laws, and doing so would take the court outside of its proper role in our constitutional democracy.
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Papadogeorgos v. McMullan,
2025 BCCA 439
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2025/11/26
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals the order of the summary trial judge equally dividing the parties’ former family residence. The appellant maintains that the trial judge failed to properly address his claim for excluded property or, alternatively, erred in failing to order unequal division. Held: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge’s rejection of the appellant’s claim for excluded property was based on factual findings that have not been shown to reflect palpable and overriding error. The appellant has also not demonstrated any error in principle by the trial judge in declining to exercise her discretion to order unequal division of the family residence.
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R. v. Sewell,
2025 BCCA 433
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2025/11/19
Court of Appeal
The applicant seeks bail pending an application for leave to appeal his sentence to the Supreme Court of Canada. The applicant pleaded guilty to sexual assault and two voyeurism offences. The sentencing judge imposed a cumulative sentence of two years less a day to be served pursuant to a conditional sentence order. The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown appeal from sentence and imposed consecutive custodial sentences of two years less a day on the sexual assault count, six months on one of the voyeurism counts and three months on the other, finding the sentencing judge had erred by imposing concurrent sentences.
Held: Application for bail dismissed. Under s. 679(1)(c), the applicant satisfied the merits and surrender threshold but failed to meet the public interest criterion. Relevant to the reviewability interest, the applicant had not brought a motion to expedite the leave application. Balancing the interests of enforceability and reviewability, the public interest criterion supports the applicant’s continued detention.
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Posted Thursday, December 4, 2025:
Lungu v. Cabrita,
2025 BCCA 435
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2025/12/01
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges the summary dismissal of her claims in negligence, battery, and lack of informed consent arising from a medical treatment performed by the respondent doctor. The appellant argues the chambers judge erred in misapprehending parts of the evidence and in making findings of fact, in accepting and relying on the respondent’s expert evidence, and in finding the matter suitable for summary determination.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The chambers judge correctly found the appellant could not establish her claims in negligence and lack of informed consent without producing expert evidence. The chambers judge properly determined suitability and her treatment of the evidence, including the respondent’s expert evidence and findings of fact do not reflect any error.
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Posted Wednesday, December 3, 2025:
Bhatti v. Parmar,
2025 BCCA 434
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2025/11/25
Court of Appeal
The applicant husband in a family law proceeding seeks a six-month extension to file the appeal record and transcripts, submitting he needs time to raise the money to pay for the transcripts. Held: The extension of time is granted, but only until January 28, 2026. The husband did not demonstrate merit to his appeal other than his dissatisfaction with the trial judge’s apportionment of the family property. However, it is in the interests of justice to grant a shorter extension, as the husband seeks to appeal a final judgment disposing of all of his rights to family property and should have the opportunity to arrange his finances to pay for the transcripts. Due to the history of the husband’s family violence, a six-month extension would cause undue prejudice to the respondent wife.
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Osama v. Jiang,
2025 BCCA 427
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2025/12/03
Court of Appeal
The appellant leased a residential property from the respondent in order to operate a daycare. The respondent sought to terminate the tenancy under s. 49(3) of the Residential Tenancy Act so that her son could live in the residence. The appellant disputed the validity of the termination, alleging that the respondent’s son did not intend to “occupy” the residence within the meaning of s. 49(3) because the unit was set to undergo three months of renovations before anyone moved in. He says that the lease could only be terminated under s. 49.2, which sets out the process for terminating a lease in order to complete renovations. The appellant also alleged that any intent to occupy was motivated by a desire to avoid the empty homes tax and was therefore not in good faith. The trial judge concluded that the lease was validly terminated.
Held: Appeal dismissed. Not all renovations will fall under the scope of s. 49.2. In this case, the trial judge found that the nature of the renovations and the time projected to complete them made the planned delay in occupancy reasonable. She also found that the respondent’s son had a good faith intention to occupy the property and make it his primary residence. Those findings are entitled to deference on appeal.
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