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Posted Wednesday, March 18, 2026:
Mattu v. Punjab Law Group LLP,
2026 BCCA 112
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2026/03/18
Court of Appeal
This appeal arises from a failed real estate transaction involving three building lots and liability claims against the seller’s lawyer. Pursuant to the purchase and sale contracts, the buyers’ deposits were paid into the trust account of the seller’s lawyer. The appellants’ claims related to his release of the deposits to the seller before the transaction completed. The appellants argue the trial judge erred in finding no trust and that the respondent did not owe them a fiduciary obligation. They also argue he erred in concluding the respondent did not owe them a duty of care.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge made no error in finding a trust was not established over the deposits and no fiduciary obligation was owed to the appellants respecting their deposits, rooted in his interpretation of the contracts and correct treatment of the authorities. The trial judge also correctly concluded no duty of care was owed, based on his finding that a proximate relationship had not been established.
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Pasquill v. British Columbia Securities Commission,
2026 BCCA 113
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2026/03/18
Court of Appeal
This is an appeal and cross appeal arising from the order of a chambers judge that any payment to the appellant from his life income fund (“LIF”) accounts be forfeited to the BC Securities Commission. Before the chambers judge, it was uncontested that the LIF accounts fell within the ambit of s. 70(1) of the Pension Benefits Standards Act, S.B.C. 2012, c. 30, which exempts certain funds from execution, seizure or attachment. The chambers judge made the forfeiture order because he found that the payments from the LIF accounts to the appellant fell within an exception provided for in s. 70(4) and (4.1). The appellant appealed the forfeiture order. The respondent cross appealed, alleging that the chambers judge erred in declining to appoint a receiver.
Held: Appeal and cross appeal dismissed. At the hearing of the appeal, the parties were given the opportunity to provide further submissions addressing the basis upon which payments from a LIF account are said to be exempt from attachment under s. 70(1). The appellant argued that the payments are captured by s. 70(1) because they constitute both “benefits” and “money transferred under Division 7”. However, payments made from the accounts to retirees cannot be characterized as “benefits” or “money transferred under Division 7”. Therefore, s. 70(1) does not apply and the appeal is dismissed on that basis. The cross appeal is dismissed because the powers the respondent seeks to have granted to the receiver extend beyond the authority to attach payments from the LIF accounts. There is no basis to conclude that the forfeiture order as it stands will not be effective in securing those payments.
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R. v. Grier-Gaiga,
2026 BCCA 115
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2026/03/09
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals his conviction on a charge of sexual assault. The sole ground of appeal is that the trial judge erred in dismissing his pre-trial application to adduce an undated Snapchat text message in evidence pursuant to s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code. In the text message, the complainant expressed ambivalence about her relationship with the appellant. The trial judge found the text was not relevant to an issue at trial. On appeal, the appellant argues the text message was relevant to consent and the “BDSM aspect” of the parties’ relationship. Held: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was correct to find that the Snapchat text was not relevant to her consent to any of the sexual activities that formed the basis of this charge, or to any other issue at trial. The risk of admitting the Snapchat text in evidence was that the jury would rely on it to reason that the complainant consented to the charged conduct as she had consented to other sexual activity, or that she was less worthy of belief—clearly engaging the twin myth reasoning prohibited under the Criminal Code.
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Zuo v. Chen,
2026 BCCA 109
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2026/03/18
Court of Appeal
A buyer and a vendor contracted for the purchase of commercial real estate. The purchase failed to close after evidence of environmental contamination prevented the buyer from obtaining financing. The buyer sued the vendor for fraudulent misrepresentation, and her real estate broker for negligence. The vendor counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial judge dismissed the claims and granted the vendor judgment on the counterclaim. The buyer appeals. The appellant says the judge erred by (1) failing to recognize imputation of knowledge in relation to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, (2) misapprehending certain evidence and wrongfully declining to admit portions of an expert report in relation to the negligence claim, and (3) failing to consider relevant legal principles in relation to the counterclaim.
Held: Appeals dismissed. While the trial judge’s analysis of what was known to the vendor was flawed, she did not err in concluding that any representations made were not intended to induce the appellant to enter the contract and did not have that effect. Nor did she err in her factual findings regarding the negligence claim. Although the judge erred in refusing to admit certain evidence, that exclusion did not make a difference in the result. The appellant’s argument regarding the counterclaim fails through the application of uncontested findings and settled law. Had the appeals turned on the point raised by the appellant, the appellant, in any event, would not have been granted leave to advance the point, which was abandoned at trial.
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Posted Tuesday, March 17, 2026:
Yeoh v. Rawat,
2026 BCCA 114
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2026/03/09
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges an order striking her claim under Rule 9-5(1). Held: Appeal allowed. The notice of civil claim could not be struck under any of the subrules of R. 9-5(1). It presents an understandable claim for breach of contract and of the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, it is not frivolous or vexatious, there is nothing in the pleading that would prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial or hearing of the proceeding, and it is not an abuse of process to pursue in the Supreme Court a claim that could be advanced the Provincial Court or Civil Resolution Tribunal. The order dismissing the action and requiring the appellant to pay costs is set aside.
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Posted Monday, March 16, 2026:
The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3495 v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3495 (Residential Section),
2026 BCCA 111
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2026/03/10
Court of Appeal
This application arises out of an acrimonious dispute about the management of a strata corporation. The applicant seeks leave to appeal two orders effecting an adjournment of the hearing of the underlying petition proceeding pending the outcome of an upcoming special general meeting. Held: Application dismissed. Most of the terms of the orders are unappealable. Even if it were not so, leave to appeal would be refused. The arguments the applicant seeks to advance on appeal have no significance to the practice or the proceeding. The decisions of the chambers judge are highly discretionary and the appeals would lack merit. The proposed appeals would undoubtedly delay final resolution of the petition proceeding.
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Posted Friday, March 13, 2026:
Chao v. Hallmark Poultry Processors Ltd.,
2026 BCCA 108
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2026/03/13
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals a chambers judge’s decision dismissing his judicial review petition of a Reconsideration Decision of the BC Employment Standards Tribunal upholding the dismissal of his Employment Standards Act complaint alleging that he was not dismissed for cause and thus entitled to compensation on the termination of his employment.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The chambers judge identified patent unreasonableness as the appropriate standard of review and applied it correctly to the Tribunal’s Reconsideration Decision. The Reconsideration Decision involved an exercise of discretion, based on an assessment of the evidence. The exercise of discretion was not patently unreasonable having regard to the factors in s. 58(3) of the ATA.
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