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Posted Thursday, May 7, 2026:
Bhatti v. Parmar,
2026 BCCA 200
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2026/04/24
Court of Appeal
The respondent applies to dismiss the appeals as abandoned. The appellant was previously granted an extension of time to file appeal materials and missed the extended deadline, despite being warned of the risk his appeals would be dismissed. HELD: Application granted. The appellant did not demonstrate a continuing bona fide intention to appeal and the respondent is prejudiced by the delay. The appeals are dismissed.
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Clark v. Prince George (City),
2026 BCCA 202
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2026/04/30
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals from a decision dismissing his wrongful dismissal claim in which he alleged constructive dismissal when his employer placed him on unpaid leave for failure to comply with its mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. He argues that the judge erred in concluding that this did not breach his employment contract because the contract included an implied term allowing his employer to implement health and safety policies. He argues that an implied term permitting the implementation of a mandatory vaccination policy, specifically, was necessary. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge did not err in finding it unnecessary to consider whether the employment contract included an implied term specifically permitting the implementation of a mandatory vaccination policy. Once the judge found an implied term allowing the employer to implement workplace health and safety policies, the employer’s right to implement specific health and safety policies was subject only to the implied qualification that any such policy be reasonable and justified. The appellant has not demonstrated any reviewable error in the judge’s conclusion that the vaccination policy was reasonable and justified.
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Faria v. Ramos,
2026 BCCA 201
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2026/05/04
Court of Appeal
The applicant applies for leave to appeal an interim support order in a family proceeding, primarily based on the judge’s imputation of income on both parties. Held: Application for leave to appeal dismissed. The interests of justice do not favour granting leave to appeal. Interim orders in family law cases are highly discretionary and require exceptional circumstances to vary, which are not present here. The proposed appeal is not significant to the practice or the action. Although there is some merit to the grounds of appeal, this must be considered in the context of an interim order on issues that are highly fact-specific and subject to final determination on a complete record, and an appeal would unduly hinder the progress of the action.
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Lover-Peace v. Moosavi,
2026 BCCA 191
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2026/05/07
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals the decision of a chambers judge dismissing his claim for malicious prosecution against the respondent. The respondent is a physician who had one virtual appointment with the appellant. Over a period of several months, the appellant posted about the respondent on the Internet and communicated with her through her clinic. The respondent made a report of harassment to the police. An information was laid seeking a peace bond. The Crown later entered a stay of proceedings, following which the appellant commenced this action.
The appellant applied for summary judgment under R. 9-6 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. In response, the respondent maintained that the notice of civil claim did not raise a cause of action. She did not tender any evidence. The chambers judge concluded based on her assessment of the evidence that the appellant’s claim raised no genuine issue for trial and she dismissed it.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The chambers judge erred in her analysis in failing to distinguish between an assessment of the sufficiency of the pleading and an assessment of the evidence, and in her apparent reliance on evidence the respondent had not adduced. However, the order dismissing the action can be supported on the alternative ground that the notice of civil claim does not disclose a cause of action. There are no material facts pleaded to establish that the respondent initiated a prosecution.
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Posted Wednesday, May 6, 2026:
British Columbia Athletic Commissioner v. Simon Fraser University,
2026 BCCA 189
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2026/05/06
Court of Appeal
The underlying proceedings concern a catastrophic injury sustained at a martial arts tournament held at Simon Fraser University. SFU, a defendant, brought a third party claim against the British Columbia Athletic Commissioner and the Province of British Columbia. SFU alleges the Athletic Commissioner was responsible for regulating events of the sort that happened at SFU and was negligent in failing to protect the plaintiff and the public. The Province applied, unsuccessfully, to strike the third party claim. It appeals from that order. Held: Appeal allowed. The Athletic Commissioner Act, S.B.C. 2012, c. 29, and its regulations do not confer a private law duty of care. Further, to the extent that SFU seeks to establish proximity on the basis of specific interactions that the Athletic Commissioner had with the plaintiff or others, SFU’s amended third party notice does not set out the material facts necessary to establish proximity. It contains nothing but a bare plea of the Athletic Commissioner’s knowledge of the specific tournament in issue. It is plain and obvious that the facts as pleaded in SFU’s amended third party claim do not give rise to the proximity necessary to establish that the Athletic Commissioner owed the plaintiff a duty of care. SFU’s third party notice against the Province and Athletic Commissioner is struck.
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Kolias v. Barnes-Morrison,
2026 BCCA 198
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2026/04/14
Court of Appeal
The parties each filed an appeal from orders made in the underlying action addressing their failed relationship. The appellant set the hearing of her appeal (from the judge’s dismissal of a contempt application) before the respondent had time to file his factum. He applied to adjourn the hearing and for an extension of time to file his factum the same day. The respondent also applied to reinstate his own appeal which sought to have Alberta declared the appropriate jurisdiction for resolution of the parties’ disputes. Held: Adjournment and extension granted and appeal reinstated. The appeals are to be heard together and a date set.
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R. v. Chief Dsta’hyl,
2026 BCCA 176
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2026/04/28
Court of Appeal
The appellant was convicted of criminal contempt after breaching an injunction. At trial, he argued the court should excuse the breach by recognizing a novel excusatory common law defence of acting in accordance with Indigenous law. The trial judge concluded the proposed defence was an impermissible collateral attack on the injunction order. On appeal, the appellant argues the judge erred by failing to recognize the proposed defence on the basis it was a collateral attack. He further argued the judge erred in failing to admit oral history evidence adduced at trial.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The proposed defence fails in the present circumstances because disobeying the injunction was not a matter of last resort. There were other lawful and peaceful means available to the appellant to challenge the injunction. The judge did not err in concluding the proposed defence amounted to a collateral attack on the injunction order. No exception to collateral attack applies. In these circumstances, there is no reason to address the appellant’s oral history ground of appeal.
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Posted Tuesday, May 5, 2026:
British Columbia Mainland Cricket Association v. Chowdhury,
2026 BCCA 188
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2026/05/05
Court of Appeal
The appellant, the British Columbia Mainland Cricket Association (the “Society”), operates and administers the British Columbia Mainland Cricket League (the “League”). At issue on appeal is a rule overwhelmingly adopted by Society’s members (“Rule 10”), which provides that if a player is registered or plays a game in any other league in the Lower Mainland, then they forfeit their registration from the League. The respondents are an individual operating another cricket league in the Lower Mainland, Last Man Stands Canada (“LMS Canada”), which administers an abbreviated form of cricket that operates under different cricket rules, and the North Vancouver Cricket Club, a society which is a member of the Society and plays in the League. Under Rule 10, League players who join LMS Canada are subject to having their registration revoked from the League. The respondent’s petition alleges that Rule 10 is contrary to the purposes in the Society’s constitution and is therefore in contravention with the Societies Act, S.B.C. 2015, c. 18. The Society’s constitution says that its purpose is to, inter alia, foster, promote, regulate, extend, organize, and govern the playing of the game of cricket in mainland British Columbia. The chambers judge agreed with the petitioners and concluded that the Society’s enforcement of Rule 10 “quelled” cricket’s growth and player participation in the game, and impeded opportunities for skill development, contrary to its purpose to extend and promote the game. On appeal, among other things, the appellant argues that the judge misinterpreted the Society’s purposes.
Held: Appeal allowed. The chambers judge erred in principle in not applying the required holistic approach to interpreting the Society’s purposes. First, she erred in selectively considering only some of the purposes listed in the Society’s constitution—namely, the purposes to “foster” and “extend” the game of cricket. Her analysis proceeded on the erroneous premise that any restriction on player participation necessarily conflicts with the Society’s purposes, without addressing whether such restriction may be part of, and even necessary to the regulation, organization, or governance of the game. Second, the chambers judge erred in not considering the meaning of the phrase “the game of cricket” in the context of its repeated use in the Society’s constitution, bylaws, and governing rules. The phrase must be given the same interpretation when used in these contexts.
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Niescierowicz v. Brookes,
2026 BCCA 186
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2026/05/05
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals a jury verdict on liability and damages after a trial concerning two motor vehicle accidents. The jury decided the appellant was liable for both accidents and assessed only nominal damages. The appellant advances several grounds on appeal. He argues the jury verdict was perverse and the judge made various errors in her final instructions, misdirected the jury in responding to a jury question, and erred in admitting a statement of claim filed by the appellant concerning a subsequent accident in Alberta. In addition, he argues defence trial counsel’s comments about the statement of claim warranted a mistrial. Held: Appeal dismissed. A reasonable person could have arrived at the same conclusions as the jury on liability and their finding is owed deference, the judge did not make the alleged errors in her jury instructions or in admitting evidence, and there is insufficient basis to warrant a mistrial.
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R. v. Dinh,
2026 BCCA 190
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2026/05/05
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals her conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking based on voir dire rulings. The police investigation arose from an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip that the appellant was engaged in drug trafficking from the mainland to Vancouver Island. The police arrested the appellant without a warrant after observing her take the ferry from Vancouver Island to the mainland, exchange bags with the driver of a truck in a remote parking lot, and drive back towards the ferry terminal. A decision was made to delay her access to counsel until the truck driver was also arrested but she was not offered access until sometime after his arrest and during the delay she was asked if she wanted to make a statement.
The Crown conceded the appellant’s s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached as a result of: a) the delay between the arrest of the truck driver and when the appellant was offered access to counsel, and b) the attempt to elicit a statement from the appellant. The trial judge found the initial delay from the appellant’s arrest until the truck driver’s arrest did not constitute a breach. The appellant argues the judge erred in failing to find a breach of s. 9, failing to find a further breach of s. 10(b), and by declining to exclude the drug evidence under s. 24(2).
Held: Appeal dismissed. With respect to s. 9, the evidence at trial supported the judge’s conclusion that the authorizing officer’s grounds for the appellant’s arrest were objectively as well as subjectively reasonable. It was open to the judge to deny defence counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the officer who investigated the Crime Stoppers tip. With respect to s. 10(b), the judge did not err by finding the initial delay was reasonable in all the circumstances. In the s. 24(2) analysis, the judge erred in assessing the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct. Conducting the s. 24(2) analysis afresh, it remains the case that excluding the drug evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
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R. v. Gallagher,
2026 BCCA 196
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2026/04/27
Court of Appeal
The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering and committing arson to a pharmacy. The fire spread to the surrounding businesses, causing a total of $472,434 in damages. The appellant was sentenced to an aggregate custodial sentence of three years and nine months, followed by a three-year probation order. The sentencing judge also imposed a stand-alone restitution order, in favour of two insurance companies, which required the appellant to repay them for the amounts paid to their insureds. The judge found that the payment of the order was unlikely to ever be realized.
The Crown had not sought such an order, nor did the parties make submissions as to whether one should be imposed. The appellant only sought leave to appeal the restitution order and the Crown agreed that it should be set aside.
Held: Leave to appeal granted and the appeal is allowed. The judge made errors in principle by imposing the order without first considering the applicable legal framework or seeking submissions from the parties. In considering the matter afresh, the restitution order is set aside.
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Singh v. Toor,
2026 BCCA 197
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2026/04/30
Court of Appeal
The appellant applies to stay the order of a chambers judge dismissing his application for a stay of an order of possession by the Residential Tenancy Branch (“RTB”). The underlying petition of the RTB decision has not yet been heard. The appellant argues there is a serious issue to be tried as the chambers judge erred in failing to apply s. 58(2) of the Residential Tenancy Act to find a substantial link between the RTB dispute and a separate commercial tenancy action in the British Columbia Supreme Court. The appellant submits he would face irreparable harm should the stay not be granted.
Held: Application dismissed. There is no merit to the argument that the judge was in error as the commercial and residential tenancy matters were not sufficiently related to trigger s. 58 of the Act. The appellant’s argument of irreparable harm also fails because the application to stay the British Columbia Supreme Court order dismissing the appellant’s application for a stay would not prevent the landlord from exercising their right of possession. A stay of the order of the lower court’s dismissal would have no effect on the RTB order.
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Posted Monday, May 4, 2026:
Ramrup v. Rayner,
2026 BCCA 187
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2026/05/04
Court of Appeal
The plaintiff-respondent, Ms. Rayner, commenced an action in which she sought damages arising from a fire in an apartment building in which she resided. She brought an application in the Supreme Court to have the action converted into a class proceeding on behalf of all owners and tenants in the building who sustained damages in the fire. The chambers judge, in the exercise of his discretion, granted the application and converted the action to a class proceeding. After the decision, various defendants sought “clarification” of how the judge’s reasons would affect the “commencement of proceedings” for the purpose of tolling the limitation date under s. 38.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, RSBC 1996, c. 50 [CPA]. The judge held that the limitation date was suspended on the date the respondent filed her notice of civil claim.
On appeal the appellants challenge the decision on three grounds being that the judge erred: 1) in failing to properly apply the legal framework for the conversion of an action to a class proceeding; 2) granting leave to file a Further Amended Notice of Civil Claim which did not comply with the requirements of the CPA; and 3) determining that the “commencement of the proceedings” for the purposes of s. 38.1 of the CPA was the date of the filing of the Notice of Civil Claim, being October 3, 2022.
Held: Appeal allowed solely on the issue of the date of the commencement of proceedings for the purposes of s. 38.1 of the CPA with the respondent being granted leave to file a Second Further Amended Notice of Civil Claim. The chambers judge did not err in the weighing of factors to exercise his discretion to convert the action to a class proceeding. Nor was it a prerequisite for the respondent to articulate common issues or a class definition with greater specificity at this point, on the facts of this case. However, the date of commencement of proceedings has an intrinsic nexus with the limitation period. Resolving those issues requires a more complete record and it was premature to determine that issue at the conversion application.
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Young v. Young,
2026 BCCA 195
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2026/04/17
Court of Appeal
Following their divorce in 2021, the parties filed a consent order requiring the appellant to pay spousal support indefinitely based on his income from the previous year. In 2023, the appellant moved to Ecuador where he now earns a modest annual income of $3,000. A chambers judge found that the appellant was intentionally underemployed and imputed income to him of $70,000. The appellant challenges that decision, arguing primarily that the judge failed to take into account his actual earning capacity in Canada. In support of this argument, the appellant seeks to adduce fresh evidence showing his income declined after the pandemic. Held: Application to adduce fresh evidence denied and appeal dismissed. The judge did not err in imputing an income of $70,000. The new evidence was available at the time of the hearing below. Further, the new evidence could not reasonably have affected the result. The judge took into consideration the appellant’s reduced income after the pandemic and was satisfied that the appellant had the capacity to earn between $60,000 and $80,000 annually.
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