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Posted Tuesday, April 21, 2026:
Cook v. Massey,
2026 BCCA 165
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2026/04/21
Court of Appeal
This appeal arises from a dispute between neighbours about the scope of an easement. The appellants appeal the trial judge’s interpretation of the easement, the dismissal of their claims in trespass and an award against them in private nuisance, among other things. Held: Appeal dismissed. The appellants have not shown palpable and overriding error in relation to any of their grounds of appeal. The outcome in this case largely turned on the judge’s interpretation of the easement which was reasonable and error free.
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RStyle Enterprises Ltd. v. 1308879 B.C. Ltd.,
2026 BCCA 168
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2026/04/21
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges the decision of the chambers judge made pursuant to s. 215(1) of the Land Title Act, cancelling a certificate of pending litigation (“CPL”). The appellant pleaded a claim to an interest in land in the amount of the deposit paid to the respondent, enforceable through a purchaser’s lien over the properties. In cancelling the CPL, the judge followed a BCSC decision that was subsequently overturned by this Court.
Held: Appeal allowed. As the case relied on by the judge is indistinguishable, this Court’s conclusion in that case governs here.
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Posted Monday, April 20, 2026:
Glencore Canada Corporation v. FTI Consulting Canada Inc.,
2026 BCCA 167
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2026/04/20
Court of Appeal
This is an appeal from an order requiring payment of harmonized sales tax (HST) by the appellant, a recipient of a taxable supply, to a receiver acting for a supplier in a proceeding under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). The supplier had failed to report and remit HST to the Crown (through the Canada Revenue Agency or CRA) prior to its insolvency. The supplier also owed a substantial sum to the appellant in relation to a settlement agreement. When the receiver demanded payment of the HST owing under certain supply contracts between the parties, the appellant sought to set off the amounts of the invoices, including HST, under a set-off clause in the supply contracts.
The supervising judge concluded the appellant did not have the right to a contractual set-off of the HST as against another liability of the supplier. She held that under the Excise Tax Act (ETA), HST payable by a recipient is a debt to CRA, not the supplier. Although the scheme of the ETA requires the supplier to collect the HST from the recipient, it does so as agent for CRA. The judge could not interpret the set-off clause in the parties’ contract to negate the legal requirement of mutuality. She also ordered the appellant to pay the interest and penalties CRA assessed as against the supplier for the failure to report and remit.
Held: Appeal allowed only to the extent of varying the order to exclude the requirement for the appellant to pay the interest and penalties assessed against the supplier. The judge did not err in her interpretation of the ETA or the set-off clause in the parties’ contract. Under the ETA, the supplier acts as a trustee for CRA, and its obligations are to collect the HST for and on behalf of CRA and hold the funds in trust for CRA until they are remitted. The set-off clause permitted either party to “set off any of its liabilities to the other party against any liabilities of the other party to itself”, thus incorporating a requirement of mutuality. The set-off clause, while broadly worded, did not permit the appellant to set off HST in the circumstances here because the tax was not a liability to the supplier in its own right.
The judge’s order that the appellant pay the HST to the receiver was a reasonable exercise of her discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA. It allowed the receiver to receive the funds on behalf of the supplier as agent for CRA and distribute them among the creditors in accordance with the CCAA. However, the order that the appellant pay the interest and penalties CRA assessed against the supplier was unreasonable in light of the record.
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K.S. v. C.W.K.,
2026 BCCA 170
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2026/04/02
Court of Appeal
The appellant, K.S., appealed a judgment after trial alleging that the trial judge had erred in failing to enforce a Marriage Portion or Mehr that formed part of a Marriage Contract entered into at the time of the parties’ Iranian marriage. The trial judge concluded that, in light of the other financial orders made, enforcing the Mehr would be unfair under the Family Relations Act.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge instructed himself of the correct legal principles and applied them correctly to the parties’ circumstances. The trial judge’s factual findings were supported by the evidence, and he exercised his discretion appropriately.
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Sull v. Trevitt,
2026 BCCA 163
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2026/04/20
Court of Appeal
This appeal concerns the liability of a landlord to compensate former tenants under s. 51(2) of the Residential Tenancy Act (RTA). The respondent tenants had lived in a rental unit owned by the appellant landlord since 2014. In 2022, the landlord entered into an option to purchase agreement with buyers who intended to occupy the rental unit, and on June 17, 2022, served the tenants with a Two Month Notice to End Tenancy for Landlord’s Use of Property pursuant to s. 49(5) of the RTA (the Notice). The Notice stated that all the conditions for the sale of the rental unit had been satisfied, and the buyers or their family intended in good faith to occupy the unit. The tenants accepted the Notice and moved out. The landlord understood that the buyers intended to move in after completing renovations.
In October 2022, after the tenants learned that the unit was being extensively renovated and the landlord was still the registered owner, they sought compensation under s. 51(2) of the RTA. They claimed $35,000 on a mistaken assumption that this was a cap on the amount of compensation. An arbitrator awarded the tenants the full amount of their claim for 12 months’ rent totalling $67,800. On judicial review, the judge remitted the matter back to the RTB on grounds of procedural fairness. The same arbitrator heard the matter again and awarded the tenants $65,000 (the maximum allowed at the time) payable by the landlord. A further petition for judicial review was dismissed. This is an appeal from that order.
Held: Appeal allowed. The arbitrator’s decision requiring the landlord to pay the tenants $65,000 was patently unreasonable as it was based on irrelevant factors and failed to take the statutory requirements of the RTA into account. In awarding compensation to the tenants, the arbitrator focused on the validity of the Notice, which is not a ground for compensation under s. 51. The arbitrator was required to assess whether the stated purpose for ending the tenancy was accomplished within a reasonable time under s. 51(2) and if not, whether there was a basis to excuse the landlord due to extenuating circumstances under s. 51(3). His focus on the Notice issue stemmed from legal and factual errors in interpreting the RTA to limit s. 49(5) notices to only “standard purchase and sale agreements” and finding that the buyers under the option to purchase agreement were not “purchasers” as defined in s. 49(1).
The matter is remitted to RTB only on the question of whether the landlord or the buyers should be excused under s. 51(3) from paying compensation under s. 51(2) due to extenuating circumstances and to consider whether and by what means notice of the compensation claim is given to the buyers.
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Posted Friday, April 17, 2026:
R. v. Wareing,
2026 BCCA 160
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2026/04/17
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals their conviction for second-degree murder and attempted murder following a trial by judge and jury. The appellant contends the judge erred in their charge to the jury by failing to provide a no probative value instruction for certain pieces of after-the-fact evidence, and failing to instruct the jury that the order of gunshots was relevant to the appellant’s defence. Held: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge did not err in not providing a no probative value instruction for the appellant’s flight or failure to call 911 after-the-fact. The evidence had some probative value in relation to the question whether the appellant had acted in self-defence. When read as a whole, the charge reflected the appellant’s account of the events, and the judge properly instructed the jury on the use of this evidence. The trial judge also did not err in their charge on the sequence of shots, as it properly instructed the jury on the overlap of intent and commission of the act, and no further instruction was appropriate on the evidence.
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Sky v. Toronto-Dominion Bank,
2026 BCCA 158
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2026/04/17
Court of Appeal
This appeal arises from an application for leave to amend, wherein a chambers judge allowed some amendments, refused others, and struck a paragraph of the notice of civil claim. The judge was of the view that the relevant portions were a collateral attack on an order nisi and an abuse of process. The appellant says the judge erred in that conclusion. Held: Appeal allowed. It is not plain and obvious that the relevant portions of the claim constitute a collateral attack or abuse of process. It is not duplicative, and permitting the claim will not result in manifest unfairness to the respondent or bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
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Posted Thursday, April 16, 2026:
British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Chatterton,
2026 BCCA 159
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2026/04/16
Court of Appeal
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a defence application for summary judgment. The appellant argues the judge erred in law by misinterpreting the statutory provision that allows for liability. That provision holds the provincial government liable for torts committed by provincial constables in the performance of their duties. The appellant says the judge erred in finding that the negligent acts of the alleged tortfeasor were performed as a provincial constable. From the appellant’s perspective, the pleaded misconduct is not captured by the statutory provision.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge did not engage in a statutory interpretation analysis or interpret a written agreement the appellant says properly informs the statutory interpretation analysis. Instead, she found that because of a 2006 decision from this Court that engaged with the same provision, the interpretation advanced by the appellant was not obvious and is a matter that requires full examination at trial. Consequently, the judge concluded the appellant had not shown beyond a doubt the underlying civil claim was bound to fail. The judge’s decision is subject to a deferential standard of review and on the record in this case, it was open to her to reach the conclusion she did. There is no principled basis for appellate interference.
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Murphy v. Morgan,
2026 BCCA 152
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2026/04/16
Court of Appeal
This appeal is from an order awarding the appellant damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The appellant alleges the judge erred by reducing the awards for non-pecuniary damages, past loss of earning capacity, and future loss of earning capacity on account of negative contingencies that were not established by the evidence or by application of the correct legal principles to the evidence. Held: Appeal allowed. The judge erred by reducing the awards for non-pecuniary damages, and loss of past and future earning capacity on account of the appellant’s subsequent injuries and health issues. The negative contingencies were not firmly grounded in the evidence or based on the application of proper principles.
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R. v. Dancho,
2026 BCCA 155
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2026/04/16
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals from the summary conviction appeal judge’s dismissal of his application for an extension of time to appeal his deemed conviction for a traffic infraction. He argues that the ICBC penalty points and administrative penalty associated with the infraction were collateral consequences that rendered his guilty plea uninformed and thus invalid. He also seeks to adduce fresh evidence to support his position that the judge made errors of fact. Held: Application to adduce fresh evidence allowed in part; appeal dismissed. The fresh evidence relating to the appellant’s penalty points for previous driving offences does not satisfy the Palmer test because it would not have affected the summary conviction appeal judge’s decision. The judge applied the correct legal standard in assessing the merits of the proposed appeal, and her finding that the appellant’s plea was informed was not based on misconceived evidence.
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