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Posted Monday, June 16, 2025:
Cai v. Ping,
2025 BCCA 205
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2025/06/05
Court of Appeal
The applicants (plaintiffs in the court below) seek leave to appeal an order dismissing their applications for judgment against the defendants under Rule 9-7 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules as not suitable for summary determination. The applicants say the judge erred in dismissing the applications on the basis of a conflict in the evidence without adequately considering their legal argument which accepted the defendants’ version of the facts.
Held: Application dismissed. The point on appeal is not significant to the practice or the parties and there is no arguable case that the judge made a reviewable error in exercising his discretion to dismiss the applications as unsuitable. He considered a number of factors in determining that the matter was unsuitable for summary trial, and did not fail to consider the applicants’ legal argument. The appeal risks hindering the progress of the underlying action, and it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave.
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Garousi v. Garousi,
2025 BCCA 198
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2025/06/16
Court of Appeal
The applicant seeks an extension of time to appeal an order dismissing his application for retroactive variation of child and spousal support. The respondent opposes the application, relying on the Court’s discretion not to hear an appeal where the appellant has failed to comply with a court order, and on the basis that the proposed appeal is without merit.
Held: Application allowed. Most of the criteria weigh in favour of granting the extension of time, given the particular circumstances of this case. While the merits of the proposed appeal are weak, it is not doomed to fail. The discretion not to hear an appeal from a party who has failed to comply with a court order is reserved for a division of the Court, not a single Justice in chambers.
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Goldberg v. British Columbia (Assessor of Area #09 – Vancouver Sea to Sky Region),
2025 BCCA 206
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2025/06/05
Court of Appeal
The applicant seeks an extension of time to bring an application to vary the order of a single justice that dismissed his application to remove his appeal from the inactive list and to extend the time to file appeal materials.
Held: Application dismissed. The applicant has not explained his delay in bringing his review application. While he may have had a bona fide intention to appeal, and the specific delay is short, there is ongoing prejudice to the respondents caused by the applicant’s broader pattern of delay. Importantly, there is no merit in the application to vary as the applicant has pointed to no reviewable error in the justice’s decision. It is not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time.
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Li v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 2884,
2025 BCCA 196
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2025/06/16
Court of Appeal
The appellants appeal from an order granting relief pursuant to s. 173(2) of the Strata Property Act authorizing a resolution for a special levy to raise approximately $3.9 million for various repairs to the building. The appellants submit the chambers judge erred by: 1) finding the Strata had proven all of the repairs were necessary; 2) failing to consider whether the Strata acted in good faith; and 3) admitting the evidence of an expert witness despite a conflict of interest. Held: appeal dismissed. The judge properly considered that all of the proposed repairs met the threshold test. The judge correctly found the appellants had failed to establish the Strata had not acted in good faith. The Court did not grant leave to challenge the admissibility of an expert’s opinion where a conflict of interest was raised for the first time on appeal.
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R. v. Ordway,
2025 BCCA 202
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2025/06/10
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals his sentence on the sole ground the sentencing judge erred by departing from the joint submission on sentence in relation to credit for his pre sentence custody. The Crown agrees the judge erred as alleged. Held: Appeal allowed. The judge erred in law by failing to recognize credit for pre sentence custody formed part of the joint submission on sentencing. She then erred by increasing the proposed sentence without applying the Anthony-Cook public interest test. The sentence should be varied such that it reflects the custodial sentence jointly proposed by the parties.
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Su v. Atom Holdings,
2025 BCCA 199
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2025/06/16
Court of Appeal
The appellant claims the judge erred in: (1) his application of the test for determining material non-disclosure at ex parte hearings; and (2) his exercise of discretion in determining that, even if non-disclosure were material, the orders should nonetheless be maintained. Held: Appeal dismissed. The chambers judge’s reasons, when read functionally, contextually and as a whole, reveal he understood and applied the relevant legal principles governing material disclosure. The threshold for materiality is low—a material fact is one that may or might affect the outcome of an application. But considering the full context and the applicable legal standard, it was open to the judge to conclude the non-disclosed evidence was immaterial. Further, his discretionary decision to maintain the ex parte orders is owed deference. The appellant has not pointed to any legal error, misapplication of principle or misconception of evidence warranting intervention by this Court. Rather, the appellant asks us to reweigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion.
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Posted Friday, June 13, 2025:
Bennison v. Bennison,
2025 BCCA 195
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2025/06/13
Court of Appeal
The appellant filed an amended notice of civil claim (“ANOCC”) in his personal capacity and purportedly in his capacity as personal representative of his father’s estate, seeking either (a) a variation of his grandfather’s will to make adequate provision for himself and his father’s estate or (b) various other relief relating to the will’s validity. The judge struck the appellant’s ANOCC as disclosing no reasonable claim. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge correctly concluded that the ANOCC discloses no reasonable claim. The appellant does not have standing to bring a wills variation claim in either his personal capacity or as personal representative of his father’s estate, as his father predeceased the testator. Due to the existence of two prior wills, the ANOCC also does not contain the necessary material facts to give rise to an intestacy arising from the invalidity of the will, and so the claims based on the will’s validity are also bound to fail.
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Duhamel v. Independent Investigations Office of British Columbia,
2025 BCCA 203
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2025/06/10
Court of Appeal
The appellant sought judicial review of a decision by the respondent, the Independent Investigations Office of British Columbia (the “IIO”), to publish a document summarizing the results of an investigation into the conduct of a police officer. The chambers judge dismissed the appellant’s petition, with costs, on the basis he did not have standing. The appellant claims the judge erred in denying him standing and ordering him to pay costs. Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge was not plainly wrong to conclude the appellant’s personal concerns about the IIO’s decision were too remote to justify granting him standing. The appellant has not identified any reviewable error in the judge’s exercise of discretion in awarding costs.
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Named Persons v. Canada (Attorney General),
2025 BCCA 197
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2025/06/13
Court of Appeal
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Posted Thursday, June 12, 2025:
Centrone v. Jones,
2025 BCCA 201
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2025/05/27
Court of Appeal
The appellant, Ms. Centrone, appeals from a post-trial order arising from a dispute over whether the respondents had a prior, enforceable agreement to purchase a portion of family property that Ms. Centrone had purchased knowing of the respondents’ agreement to purchase it. The trial judge found that the respondents were the beneficial owners and ordered Ms. Centrone to “take all steps necessary” to transfer the disputed portion of land to them. After the respondents had incurred over $25,000 in expenses preparing for the transfer they sought reimbursement from Ms. Centrone, who refused to pay. Following an application for further directions, the judge clarified that her original order required Ms. Centrone to bear the costs of the transfer, and ordered her to pay them.
On appeal, Ms. Centrone argues that the judge erred in (i) finding her responsible for the transfer costs; (ii) failing to find that the doctrine of privity of contract shields her from obligations under the respondents’ prior agreement; and (iii) departing from the general rule that trustees are indemnified for costs incurred in relation to trust property.
Held: appeal dismissed.
The appellant’s first two arguments on privity of contract fail as they attempt to collaterally attack the trial judge’s unchallenged findings. The judge found that, as Ms. Centrone had purchased the disputed portion of land in full knowledge of the prior agreement, she was obliged to effect the transfer and there was no suggestion that the respondents were responsible for the associated costs.
The third argument on trustee obligations fails to recognize the unique nature of the trust imposed in this case—a constructive trust imposed to ensure the land was conveyed to its equitable owners in response to Ms. Centrone’s self-interested conduct. The judge correctly held that the general rule on trustee expenses does not apply in this case.
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Der v. Hlookoff,
2025 BCCA 193
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2025/06/12
Court of Appeal
This appeal is from an order requiring the appellant father to release RESP funds to reimburse living and educational expenses incurred by his daughter. The appellant claims the chambers judge was precluded from making the order as the expenses in question had been finally determined by a prior court order. He asserts the refusal to consider the reasons for judgment in interpreting that prior order was an error of law.
Held: Appeal allowed. Court orders are to be interpreted with regard to the context in which they are made, which includes the reasons for judgment. In this case, the reasons below made it clear that the issue before the chambers judge had already been determined by a prior court order. There was no basis on which that prior order could be varied or set aside. It was an error for the chambers judge to refuse to consider the reasons and his resulting order must be set aside.
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Knight v. British Columbia (Public Safety),
2025 BCCA 192
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2025/06/12
Court of Appeal
This appeal from a judgment dismissing an application as a collateral attack on a decision of the Court of Appeal is summarily dismissed as vexatious pursuant to s. 21 of the Court of Appeal Act.
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Pecquery v. Gabriel,
2025 BCCA 194
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2025/06/12
Court of Appeal
This appeal arises from two jurisdictional challenges to an action relating to an alleged assault that occurred at the respondent’s workplace. The appellants sought to have the claim dismissed on the basis that the Court’s jurisdiction was ousted by operation of a collective agreement which refers labour disputes to arbitration or by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Worker’s Compensation Board (“WCB”). The chambers judge dismissed both applications, finding that (1) it was unclear whether the respondent was a member of the bargaining unit bound by the collective agreement and (2) she had no jurisdiction to determine whether the claim fell within the jurisdiction of the WCB as that question could only be decided by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal (“WCAT”) according to the statutory mechanism set out in s. 311 of the Workers Compensation Act. She also refused to stay the action pending a s. 311 determination. The appellants challenge the judge’s conclusions on both applications and the refusal to grant a stay.
Held: Appeal allowed in part. The chambers judge erred in her conclusion with respect to the collective agreement by misinterpreting the pleadings and the evidence before her. Taken as a whole, the record established that the respondent was a member of the bargaining unit to which the collective agreement applied and the dispute as pleaded appears to fall within the scope of the agreement. The respondent’s action against his employer ought to have been dismissed on this basis. The chambers judge did not err in refusing to strike the claim based on the WCB’s jurisdiction. The nature of the claim, brought against multiple parties and founded upon an alleged assault and related conspiracy, is such that the jurisdictional question is best determined by the WCAT. However, the judge did err in refusing to grant a stay pending the WCAT’s decision.
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Posted Wednesday, June 11, 2025:
Ironclad Developments Inc. v. West Kelowna (City),
2025 BCCA 191
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2025/06/11
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges the order made on a petition for judicial review affirming the decision of the City of West Kelowna to impose a latecomer charge on the appellant. The appellant submits that the decision was procedurally unfair and substantively unreasonable. The chambers judge concluded that the decision was unfair, but no duty of fairness was owed because the decision was legislative in nature.
Held: Appeal allowed. The decision was not legislative in nature, and the City owed the appellant a duty of procedural fairness. Because the appellant was not given an opportunity to provide input and feedback in the process of determining the amount of the latecomer charge to be imposed, the decision was procedurally unfair and should be quashed.
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