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Posted Tuesday, May 5, 2026:
British Columbia Mainland Cricket Association v. Chowdhury,
2026 BCCA 188
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2026/05/05
Court of Appeal
The appellant, the British Columbia Mainland Cricket Association (the “Society”), operates and administers the British Columbia Mainland Cricket League (the “League”). At issue on appeal is a rule overwhelmingly adopted by Society’s members (“Rule 10”), which provides that if a player is registered or plays a game in any other league in the Lower Mainland, then they forfeit their registration from the League. The respondents are an individual operating another cricket league in the Lower Mainland, Last Man Stands Canada (“LMS Canada”), which administers an abbreviated form of cricket that operates under different cricket rules, and the North Vancouver Cricket Club, a society which is a member of the Society and plays in the League. Under Rule 10, League players who join LMS Canada are subject to having their registration revoked from the League. The respondent’s petition alleges that Rule 10 is contrary to the purposes in the Society’s constitution and is therefore in contravention with the Societies Act, S.B.C. 2015, c. 18. The Society’s constitution says that its purpose is to, inter alia, foster, promote, regulate, extend, organize, and govern the playing of the game of cricket in mainland British Columbia. The chambers judge agreed with the petitioners and concluded that the Society’s enforcement of Rule 10 “quelled” cricket’s growth and player participation in the game, and impeded opportunities for skill development, contrary to its purpose to extend and promote the game. On appeal, among other things, the appellant argues that the judge misinterpreted the Society’s purposes.
Held: Appeal allowed. The chambers judge erred in principle in not applying the required holistic approach to interpreting the Society’s purposes. First, she erred in selectively considering only some of the purposes listed in the Society’s constitution—namely, the purposes to “foster” and “extend” the game of cricket. Her analysis proceeded on the erroneous premise that any restriction on player participation necessarily conflicts with the Society’s purposes, without addressing whether such restriction may be part of, and even necessary to the regulation, organization, or governance of the game. Second, the chambers judge erred in not considering the meaning of the phrase “the game of cricket” in the context of its repeated use in the Society’s constitution, bylaws, and governing rules. The phrase must be given the same interpretation when used in these contexts.
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Niescierowicz v. Brookes,
2026 BCCA 186
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2026/05/05
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals a jury verdict on liability and damages after a trial concerning two motor vehicle accidents. The jury decided the appellant was liable for both accidents and assessed only nominal damages. The appellant advances several grounds on appeal. He argues the jury verdict was perverse and the judge made various errors in her final instructions, misdirected the jury in responding to a jury question, and erred in admitting a statement of claim filed by the appellant concerning a subsequent accident in Alberta. In addition, he argues defence trial counsel’s comments about the statement of claim warranted a mistrial. Held: Appeal dismissed. A reasonable person could have arrived at the same conclusions as the jury on liability and their finding is owed deference, the judge did not make the alleged errors in her jury instructions or in admitting evidence, and there is insufficient basis to warrant a mistrial.
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R. v. Dinh,
2026 BCCA 190
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2026/05/05
Court of Appeal
The appellant appeals her conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking based on voir dire rulings. The police investigation arose from an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip that the appellant was engaged in drug trafficking from the mainland to Vancouver Island. The police arrested the appellant without a warrant after observing her take the ferry from Vancouver Island to the mainland, exchange bags with the driver of a truck in a remote parking lot, and drive back towards the ferry terminal. A decision was made to delay her access to counsel until the truck driver was also arrested but she was not offered access until sometime after his arrest and during the delay she was asked if she wanted to make a statement.
The Crown conceded the appellant’s s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached as a result of: a) the delay between the arrest of the truck driver and when the appellant was offered access to counsel, and b) the attempt to elicit a statement from the appellant. The trial judge found the initial delay from the appellant’s arrest until the truck driver’s arrest did not constitute a breach. The appellant argues the judge erred in failing to find a breach of s. 9, failing to find a further breach of s. 10(b), and by declining to exclude the drug evidence under s. 24(2).
Held: Appeal dismissed. With respect to s. 9, the evidence at trial supported the judge’s conclusion that the authorizing officer’s grounds for the appellant’s arrest were objectively as well as subjectively reasonable. It was open to the judge to deny defence counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the officer who investigated the Crime Stoppers tip. With respect to s. 10(b), the judge did not err by finding the initial delay was reasonable in all the circumstances. In the s. 24(2) analysis, the judge erred in assessing the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct. Conducting the s. 24(2) analysis afresh, it remains the case that excluding the drug evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
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R. v. Gallagher,
2026 BCCA 196
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2026/04/27
Court of Appeal
The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering and committing arson to a pharmacy. The fire spread to the surrounding businesses, causing a total of $472,434 in damages. The appellant was sentenced to an aggregate custodial sentence of three years and nine months, followed by a three-year probation order. The sentencing judge also imposed a stand-alone restitution order, in favour of two insurance companies, which required the appellant to repay them for the amounts paid to their insureds. The judge found that the payment of the order was unlikely to ever be realized.
The Crown had not sought such an order, nor did the parties make submissions as to whether one should be imposed. The appellant only sought leave to appeal the restitution order and the Crown agreed that it should be set aside.
Held: Leave to appeal granted and the appeal is allowed. The judge made errors in principle by imposing the order without first considering the applicable legal framework or seeking submissions from the parties. In considering the matter afresh, the restitution order is set aside.
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Singh v. Toor,
2026 BCCA 197
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2026/04/30
Court of Appeal
The appellant applies to stay the order of a chambers judge dismissing his application for a stay of an order of possession by the Residential Tenancy Branch (“RTB”). The underlying petition of the RTB decision has not yet been heard. The appellant argues there is a serious issue to be tried as the chambers judge erred in failing to apply s. 58(2) of the Residential Tenancy Act to find a substantial link between the RTB dispute and a separate commercial tenancy action in the British Columbia Supreme Court. The appellant submits he would face irreparable harm should the stay not be granted.
Held: Application dismissed. There is no merit to the argument that the judge was in error as the commercial and residential tenancy matters were not sufficiently related to trigger s. 58 of the Act. The appellant’s argument of irreparable harm also fails because the application to stay the British Columbia Supreme Court order dismissing the appellant’s application for a stay would not prevent the landlord from exercising their right of possession. A stay of the order of the lower court’s dismissal would have no effect on the RTB order.
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Posted Monday, May 4, 2026:
Ramrup v. Rayner,
2026 BCCA 187
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2026/05/04
Court of Appeal
The plaintiff-respondent, Ms. Rayner, commenced an action in which she sought damages arising from a fire in an apartment building in which she resided. She brought an application in the Supreme Court to have the action converted into a class proceeding on behalf of all owners and tenants in the building who sustained damages in the fire. The chambers judge, in the exercise of his discretion, granted the application and converted the action to a class proceeding. After the decision, various defendants sought “clarification” of how the judge’s reasons would affect the “commencement of proceedings” for the purpose of tolling the limitation date under s. 38.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, RSBC 1996, c. 50 [CPA]. The judge held that the limitation date was suspended on the date the respondent filed her notice of civil claim.
On appeal the appellants challenge the decision on three grounds being that the judge erred: 1) in failing to properly apply the legal framework for the conversion of an action to a class proceeding; 2) granting leave to file a Further Amended Notice of Civil Claim which did not comply with the requirements of the CPA; and 3) determining that the “commencement of the proceedings” for the purposes of s. 38.1 of the CPA was the date of the filing of the Notice of Civil Claim, being October 3, 2022.
Held: Appeal allowed solely on the issue of the date of the commencement of proceedings for the purposes of s. 38.1 of the CPA with the respondent being granted leave to file a Second Further Amended Notice of Civil Claim. The chambers judge did not err in the weighing of factors to exercise his discretion to convert the action to a class proceeding. Nor was it a prerequisite for the respondent to articulate common issues or a class definition with greater specificity at this point, on the facts of this case. However, the date of commencement of proceedings has an intrinsic nexus with the limitation period. Resolving those issues requires a more complete record and it was premature to determine that issue at the conversion application.
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Young v. Young,
2026 BCCA 195
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2026/04/17
Court of Appeal
Following their divorce in 2021, the parties filed a consent order requiring the appellant to pay spousal support indefinitely based on his income from the previous year. In 2023, the appellant moved to Ecuador where he now earns a modest annual income of $3,000. A chambers judge found that the appellant was intentionally underemployed and imputed income to him of $70,000. The appellant challenges that decision, arguing primarily that the judge failed to take into account his actual earning capacity in Canada. In support of this argument, the appellant seeks to adduce fresh evidence showing his income declined after the pandemic. Held: Application to adduce fresh evidence denied and appeal dismissed. The judge did not err in imputing an income of $70,000. The new evidence was available at the time of the hearing below. Further, the new evidence could not reasonably have affected the result. The judge took into consideration the appellant’s reduced income after the pandemic and was satisfied that the appellant had the capacity to earn between $60,000 and $80,000 annually.
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Posted Friday, May 1, 2026:
Jiang v. Peoples Trust Company,
2026 BCCA 185
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2026/05/01
Court of Appeal
The appellant applies for leave to appeal an order made in chambers by the case management judge in this certified consumer class action. The appellant applied to obtain financial documents held by extra-provincial and foreign non-parties, and to subpoena or depose representatives of those parties. The applications were brought pursuant to Rule 7 and s. 5 of the Subpoena (Interprovincial) Act. The chambers judge dismissed the application after determining the appellant was using Rule 7 deposition processes in aid of pre-trial examination and discovery of documents.
Held: (1) Leave to appeal is required. The authority for the orders was Part 7 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. Letters of request are limited appeal orders. While it is within the inherent jurisdiction of the court to issue letters of request, that power is fully within Rule 7-8 and takes its procedural character from that Rule. Subpoenas issued via the SIA are not an independent authority for extra-provincial subpoenas. Their authority comes through the SCCR; and (2) The application for leave is dismissed. The appeal is not of significance to the practice or the action. While the grounds of appeal are not frivolous, they do not have high merit. Discretionary orders by a case management judge are owed considerable deference. The appeal would likely hinder the progress of the proceeding in the court below.
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Morton v. Cherkaoui,
2026 BCCA 179
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2026/05/01
Court of Appeal
These are supplementary reasons on costs. Held: Respondent is entitled to ordinary costs from the appellant. The appellant’s conduct on appeal does not meet the test for awarding special costs.
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R. v. S.C.W.,
2026 BCCA 180
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2026/05/01
Court of Appeal
As part of his sentence for sexual interference and making child pornography, the appellant is subject to a 20-year prohibition order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code. Upon completing his prison sentence and parole, the appellant applied under s. 161(3) to vary the conditions and duration of this prohibition order. His application was mostly unsuccessful. He now appeals and seeks to adduce fresh evidence regarding his current circumstances and risk of re-offending. Held: Leave to appeal is granted, but the appeal and application to adduce fresh evidence are dismissed. A court considering an application to vary under s. 161(3) has jurisdiction to revisit not only the conditions of the prohibition order, but also its duration, where the judge finds it “desirable” to do so based on circumstances that have changed since the order was imposed. The judge did not err in concluding that reducing the order’s duration was not “desirable” on the evidence before him. Nor did the judge err in declining to vary the conditions of the order to any greater extent than he did. As the judge did not commit any reviewable error in reaching his conclusion, the fresh evidence application is dismissed.
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Rehak v. MacDougall,
2026 BCCA 192
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2026/04/29
Court of Appeal
The appellant challenges the judge’s order pronouncing a will (executed by the deceased in 2016) in solemn form. The will left the estate to the deceased’s children, the residue to his former spouse, and nothing to the appellant, his spouse since 1994 (consistent with a prenuptial agreement). The appellant alleged suspicious circumstances and sought to rebut the presumption of validity.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The judge: (1) did not err by determining the issues summarily; (2) did not fail to assess, in accordance with the correct legal framework, the alleged suspicious circumstances; and (3) did not err when she rejected the evidence of the handwriting expert, preferring the evidence of two witnesses present at the time the will was signed.
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Salerno v. Sahota,
2026 BCCA 182
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2026/05/01
Court of Appeal
The appellant, Ms. Salerno, appeals from a jury’s award of damages on a negligence claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident. She alleges the judge erred (1) in failing to provide a limiting instruction concerning the use of a hearsay medical record, and (2) in suggesting a particular valuation method under the capital asset approach to loss of future earning capacity. Held: Appeal allowed, in part. (1) The judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that a hearsay opinion stating Ms. Salerno’s pre-existing medical issues were “consistent with” fibromyalgia could not be relied upon for the truth of its contents. However, this misdirection did not occasion any substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the error, while legally significant, had no practical impact on the jury’s award. (2) The judge erred in law in instructing the jury that the capital asset approach to valuing loss of future income “usually involves” an award equal to one or more years of a plaintiff’s pre-collision income. There are a number of different methods for valuing loss under the capital asset approach, and the controlling jurisprudence does not suggest any “usual” or “preferred” method. The selection of the appropriate method for valuing the loss is a matter for the trier of fact to determine, based on an assessment of the factual matrix of the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed by the evidence. This error prejudiced Ms. Salerno’s position because her counsel urged the jury to adopt a different method for valuing the loss, and a properly instructed jury could reasonably have followed that approach to arrive at a different verdict on loss of future earning capacity. The jury’s award of $50,000 for loss of future earning capacity is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the court below for a judge-alone reconsideration of that particular head of damages. The jury award on all other heads of damage is undisturbed.
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Posted Wednesday, April 29, 2026:
R. v. Lekhraj,
2026 BCCA 175
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2026/04/29
Court of Appeal
The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and creation of child pornography. The trial concluded six weeks and two days past the 18-month presumptive ceiling for trials in provincial court. Eight months after conviction, the appellant applied for a stay of proceedings, contending his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached, contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter. That application was dismissed and the appellant was sentenced to three years and three months in custody. The appellant appeals, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) application and in engaging in impermissible propensity reasoning.
Held: Appeal allowed. The convictions must be set aside because the trial judge fell into prejudicial reasoning. The judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility, which was integral to the convictions, rested in part on evidence of the appellant’s character and his discreditable conduct unrelated to the offences charged. A new trial is therefore ordered. The trial judge did not err in dismissing the appellant’s s. 11(b) application. Delay beyond the presumptive ceiling was mitigated by a discrete event—the complainant’s inability to testify due to illness, which necessitated rescheduling the trial. Delay below the presumptive ceiling was not made out. The application was brought late in the proceedings, so the appellant could not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the process.
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