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Posted Monday, April 13, 2026:
Genesis Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Blais,
2026 BCCA 157
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2026/04/07
Court of Appeal
Genesis Mortgage Investment Corp. (“Genesis”) loaned the respondents $2,400,000 to finance the redevelopment of a property in Kelowna. This loan was secured by a mortgage against both the development property and the respondents’ family home. The respondents defaulted on the lean and Genesis commenced foreclosure proceedings. Pursuant to the order nisi, Genesis was awarded its costs on an indemnity basis. After the court-approved sale of the development property, the respondents requested an assessment of Genesis’s indemnity costs to ascertain the updated amount required to redeem the family home. Genesis claimed costs and disbursements in the amount of $104,067.39 but refused to waive privilege over its legal accounts while litigation was ongoing, preventing assessment of its claimed costs. An associate judge ordered Genesis to have its costs assessed. This decision was upheld on appeal to a Supreme Court judge. Genesis applies for leave to appeal to this Court and for a stay of the orders below pending determination of its appeal.
Held: Leave to appeal and stay granted.
This appeal raises the question of whether a lender awarded indemnity costs in a foreclosure can be compelled to have its costs assessed while litigation is ongoing. Either outcome of the proposed appeal could have significant consequences to parties in foreclosure proceedings. The proposed appeal is important to the parties, has some merit, and will not unduly hinder the underlying proceedings. It is in the interests of justice to stay the orders of the court below pending appeal. There is risk of irreparable harm if Genesis is forced to waive solicitor-client privilege before the determination of its appeal. The respondents do not stand to suffer significant prejudice if the stay is granted.
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Morton v. Cherkaoui,
2026 BCCA 156
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2026/03/16
Court of Appeal
The appellant and respondent started a wine importation company together. Several years into this venture, the respondent sought and was granted leave to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company against the appellant. The appellant appeals the chambers judge’s decision granting leave to bring the action. He argues that the judge erred: (1) in refusing his request for an adjournment, (2) in dismissing his application to remove the respondent’s counsel due to a conflict of interest, (3) in granting the respondent leave to commence the derivative action, and (4) in awarding solicitor-client costs in the cause of the derivative action. Held: Appeal dismissed. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any reviewable error in the judge’s decision.
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Posted Friday, April 10, 2026:
Perry v. General Motors of Canada,
2026 BCCA 147
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2026/04/10
Court of Appeal
This is an application for an order declaring the proceedings vexatious. Held: Application granted. The appellant has persistently and without reasonable cause commenced and continued vexatious proceedings. He has repeatedly failed to comply with timelines and has demonstrated an inability to focus on the real issues in dispute, instead making inflammatory and unsupported allegations of misconduct against the respondents and their counsel. The appellant is prohibited from commencing or continuing any future appeal relating to the within proceedings without leave of the Court or a Justice.
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R. v. Skiffington,
2026 BCCA 151
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2026/04/10
Court of Appeal
In an earlier decision, the appellant was granted leave to cross-examine witnesses in relation to a fresh evidence application. The Crown now applies pursuant to s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting two retired police officers to testify via videoconferencing. Held: Application granted for one police officer and dismissed for the other. In the circumstances presented, an order permitting videoconferencing is not appropriate where the impact of personal attendance is outweighed by prejudice to the appellant.
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Posted Thursday, April 9, 2026:
Northern Health Authority v. du Plessis,
2026 BCCA 143
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2026/04/09
Court of Appeal
The respondent was a pediatrician under service contract with the appellant health authority during the COVID-19 pandemic. The appellant terminated the 2021 service contract because the respondent did not receive a vaccination against COVID-19, contending the contract had been frustrated as the respondent was required to obtain a vaccination pursuant to an order by the Provincial Health Officer to continue to provide services. The respondent disputed the termination and commenced arbitration. In an initial award, the arbitrator found the NHA had breached the service contract by terminating the respondent. In a subsequent remedy award, the arbitrator found the respondent was entitled to damages for breach of contract and costs. The appellant filed an appeal from both awards, and the respondent filed an appeal from the remedy award. The appeals were agreed to be heard together, and both parties waived the other party’s requirement to seek leave to appeal under s. 59(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act.
Held: Appeal dismissed; cross-appeal dismissed.
On the appeal, the arbitrator’s assessment of the frustration defence, and the two elements at issue in the analysis were matters of mixed fact and law. Foreseeability as part of the frustration analysis was fact dependent, requiring the arbitrator to determine whether the parties might have reasonably contemplated the possibility of a vaccine mandate. Whether the health order was a supervening event making performance of the contract impossible also required consideration of the respondent’s contractual obligations and his unique factual circumstances. In addition, the interpretation of the health order cannot be separated from the frustration analysis as a question of law and was an integral part of the analysis. Even if viewed as an independent analysis, its interpretation is so inextricably linked to the evidentiary record that most questions raised by the NHA are questions of mixed fact and law reviewable on a deferential standard. To the extent that the NHA has identified a question of law, it is unable to demonstrate that the arbitrator erred in law in the interpretation of the health order.
On cross-appeal, the alleged questions of law arising from the remedy award are either questions of mixed fact and law or legal questions which do not arise out of the remedy award. The characterization of the dismissal is a finding of mixed fact and law and does not raise a legal question on the application of the common law presumption of reasonable notice. The question of repudiation was never raised to the arbitrator; it does not arise out of the remedy award. The respondent’s alleged question of legal construction of the contract and termination provision are attempts to reframe a central exercise of contractual interpretation of the termination provision, which was undertaken by the arbitrator, to seek a different outcome.
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Perry v. General Motors of Canada,
2026 BCCA 148
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2026/03/12
Court of Appeal
This is an application for leave to appeal an order requiring that the applicant post security for costs in the court below. If leave is granted, the applicant also seeks a stay of the order pending the hearing of the appeal, and the respondent seeks to have the applicant post security for costs in this Court. Held: Leave to appeal denied. It is not in the interests of justice to grant leave, particularly as the proposed grounds of appeal have very little merit. The two other related applications are accordingly also dismissed.
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Qi v. Liu,
2026 BCCA 146
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2026/04/09
Court of Appeal
The appellants appeal a finding that they are in contempt of an interim order made in an action arising from a dispute between the appellants, and their neighbours, the respondents. The respondents are the beneficiaries of an easement over and through the appellants’ property to the street. The easement guarantees “unobstructed access” to and from the respondents’ home and the street. By a chambers judge’s interim order, the appellants were prohibited from “obstructing” the easement. On appeal, the appellants allege that the chambers judge erred in finding them in contempt of this interim order because she erred in (1) her interpretation of the interim order: (a) by not interpreting it in a way most favourable to them given the ambiguity in the interim order (and in particular, whether “obstructing” means partial or total obstruction); (b) by referring to the easement to interpret it; and (2) by not exercising her residual discretion to decline to make a finding in contempt.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The chambers judge made no error in concluding that the interim order was clear and unequivocal in prohibiting both total and partial obstruction. Though the chambers judge erred in considering the easement in her interpretation of the order, it was immaterial, because the appellants could ascertain their precise obligations without reference to the easement. Finally, the chambers judge did not err in exercising her residual discretion because the appellants never asked her to do so.
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